Article
citation information:
Melnyk, O., Bychkovsky, Y.,
Voloshyn, A. Maritime situational awareness аs a key measure for safe
ship operation. Scientific Journal of
Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport. 2022, 114, 91-101. ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2022.114.8.
Oleksiy MELNYK[1],
Yuriy BYCHKOVSKY[2],
Andrii VOLOSHYN[3]
MARITIME
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS АS A KEY MEASURE FOR SAFE SHIP OPERATION
Summary. The maritime industry
is a high-risk industry, which constantly has to make decisions in a rapidly
changing environment. Therefore, understanding the essence of "situational
awareness" is very important for making the right decision. In this regard,
it is obvious that a correct situation analysis, based on a theoretical basis,
creates the proper prerequisites for making the right decision in a developing
situation, and vice versa. Considering this fact, this article proposes to
study the factors that influence this phenomenon, their regularities and
connections. It presents the data of a survey among seafarers to determine the
level of understanding of situational awareness as a predominant component of
the human factor in most accidents in the maritime industry.
Keywords: maritime safety, human element, situational
awareness
1.
INTRODUCTION
The
importance of situational awareness among other human factors confirmed reviews
of casualty investigations conducted by several researchers. Speaking about
situational awareness [1, 6], it is worth mentioning the fact that this
phenomenon is closely interconnected with other components of the individual
human factor, such as fatigue, stress, health fitness, communication, alcohol,
etc. This is evidenced by the numerous studies carried out in [3, 7, 12, 13].
One of the most important aspects of the human element – situational
awareness, was defined as “being aware of your surroundings” in
[5]. An early study of situational awareness was administered in [11]. The
study, aimed at defining human factors associated with accidents in the maritime
industry, was conducted at a time when the seriousness of human error had not
been fully realized. Initially, it was supposed that marine casualties are a
result of some factors and human error is a contributing, if not the
fundamental factor. Summarizing the scientific works on this problem, it is
necessary to say that since long ago in maritime educational institutions there
was a practice according to which situational awareness was understood as a
requirement to keep oneself closer to danger.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
There is no doubt how important situational awareness is to maritime safety in general, so let us consider this factor in detail. The term "situational awareness" means:
- having a good perception of your surroundings at all times;
- comprehending the happenings around your ship;
- predicting how this will affect your ship.
Indeed, looking at the global statistics of maritime losses in recent years (Figure 1), one can see how much loss has been incurred by shipping companies around the world from maritime incidents.
Fig. 1. Total losses by the year 2019 [1]
Costs for losses and consequences from losses to the marine environment is on the increase. This reality is well understood if we consider only a few accidents with ships of the US Navy, NATO countries, for example, the accidents of the US Navy destroyer "FITZGERALD" with the container ship "ACX CRYSTAL", the accidents of the US destroyer "JOHN MCCAIN". with the tanker "ALNIC MC", the accident of the Norwegian Navy frigate "HELGE INGSTAD" with the tanker "SOLA TS", the collision of the Greek Navy minesweeper "KALLISTO" with the container ship "MAERSK LAUNCESTON". Due to these four incidents alone, over the past 4 years, an accrued total loss in expenses of over two milliards of USD was incurred, 17 sailors were killed and about 307 were injured. According to the definitions of the investigations, the main reason for these accidents was the "human element", however, among the factors of the "human element", a large percentage is accounted for by the factor of "situational awareness". This motivated us once more to take up on the topic of "situational awareness".
The meaning of the term leads us to the unique phenomenon – situation awareness is, therefore, a state, as well as a process [2]. Hence, to have good situational awareness, mariners should focus on the following factors, which could be classified into four groups (Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Interconnectivity between factors and situational awareness
Tab. 1
Functional elements of situational awareness
Informational influences |
Environmental influences |
Organizational influences |
Personal influences |
traffic density including concentrations
of fishing vessels or any other ships |
state of visibility |
familiarization with the working environment
in a way of construction, design and interface of used equipment |
fitness for duty |
maneuverability of own ship; the draft
concerning the available depth of water |
state of the wind, sea, current or tide,
indoors and outdoors temperature |
presence and following of well
introduced watchkeeping procedures, instructions, orders |
working overload (fatigue; stress) |
knowledge of characteristics and
limitations of used equipment including its design, interface, variety,
quality and reliability; level of automation |
vibration; noise |
flexible composition of watch personnel
depending on many personal factors |
communication |
accuracy of own position, course, speed
and proximity of navigational hazards |
part of a day (lights/darkness) |
maintenance of a proper voyage planning
procedure |
competency; experience, training, skills |
N/A |
N/A |
good maintenance of interaction between
a man and a machine |
relationship between crewmembers |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
dependence on navigational aids and landmarks;
navigational equipment and various alarms |
Each functional element presented in Table 1 above has a particular role to play in the development and maintenance of situational awareness. This list could be continued, for instance: presence of cellular phones in a wheel house could greatly compromise the whole situational awareness, or gender and marital status of watchkeeping personnel and so on. These factors are further discussed in this work.
We can reflect the interaction of these elements in a structural form and show how the predominant factor can be addressed to mitigate its effect on situational awareness. It is also pertinent to mention here that the term ‘situational awareness’ is highlighted on the global scene to build up a useful model in the maritime industry to train the decision making processes and the interdependencies in safety issues of the operations [4, 5].
Having the above information, we can declare that situational awareness means an accurate understanding of the happenings around you and what is likely to happen, or in other words, a duty officer shall:
- perceive what is happening;
- understand what is happening;
- think ahead based on this.
Fig. 3. Phases of situational awareness [2]
Let us take a more precise look at each phase’s element of situational awareness.
The first phase (1 Level) – Perception of the Elements (use of own senses) involves perceiving the status, attributes and dynamics of task-related elements in the surrounding environment. The data perceived by the individual undergoing the decision making process depends on a variety of factors, which includes the nature of task, complexity of the operation, nature of input information, level of difficulty, dependent variables, operator goals, the experience of the individual, expectations of the process and operator, design interface, system design complexity, man-machine interaction, capabilities and automation of the machinery [5]. It looks simple but it is a process that requires discipline, as well as knowing what to look for, when to look for it and why.
The second phase (2 Level) – Comprehension of the current situation (creating a mental picture) involves understanding how important the data is concerning the task and goals ahead. It is a very important stage as the goals of the task depend on the understanding of important data, which can accomplish a particular work task in a much more effective and safe way. During level 2, “the decision maker forms a holistic picture of the environment, comprehending the significance of objects and events” [5].
The third phase (3 Level) – Forecasting future system states (thinking ahead). It simply is “sailing ahead of the ship”. Features in the environment are mapped to mental models in the operator’s mind, and the models are then used to facilitate the development of situational awareness [3, 4]. Indeed, it considers future system states meaning that it involves determining future states of the system and its elements for the complex and different decision making processes, which involves intense thinking and assessment to achieve a desired goal in the future event. This step is crucial in the decision making process and requires that one’s understanding, based on gathered data, is as accurate as possible.
2.1. Losing
situational awareness
However, situational awareness could
be compromised at each level of the previously described process. For instance
– Figure 4.
It is very important to bear in mind
factors, which could compromise situational awareness. Almost all of them have
psychological roots. Mainly, we need to recall the importance of the following
factors: boredom, carelessness, channelized attention, complacency, confidence,
distraction, expectancy, human information processing, inattention, judgment,
motivation, non-compliance with orders, pressing, technique, training [7, 8].
Among these factors, first, it
should be called a distraction from the performance of official duties. From a
technician’s point of view, distractions come in many forms such as a
cold wind through a door, excessive movement of the ship and presence of
working seafarers on deck, frustration over lack of parts and tools to perform
tasks effectively and efficiently. Causes of attention lapses include, but are
not limited to phone calls, games in the workplace, shift change, sleep
deprivation, illness, poor morale, problems at home, poor housekeeping on board
ship, visitors, etc. [9]. The aforementioned points shall be
duly counted by the watchkeeping personnel otherwise we will not be able to
maintain a proper situational awareness on board a ship.
Fig. 4. Disruption factors of
situational awareness at each level
2.2. Recovering situational awareness
Below are a few pieces of advice,
which could be useful when faced with the need of situational awareness
recovering:
-
follow
the rules and standard operating procedures, call master, at least;
-
change
from automation to manual, if you expect any course alteration;
-
advance
time either by slowing down and/or altering course;
-
do
not hesitate to use communication - ask for help;
-
seek
the nearest stable, simple and safe method; go back to the last thing that you
are sure of;
-
assess
the situation from different perspectives with different sources;
-
expand
your focus to avoid fixation;
-
take
time to think, use that time and be willing to be delayed [14].
3. RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
We conducted a study among seafarers of different age groups to
determine the following:
-
the
degree of study of the factor "situational awareness";
-
understanding
of the essence of "situational awareness" among seafarers;
-
measures
to improve the current situation.
So, we have initial basic knowledge
regarding situational awareness and will take a step further toward assessment
of understanding of this phenomenon factor among seafarers. For obtaining as
accurate figures as possible, we select some respondents using Yamane’s
or Sloven’s formula (1):
n=N/(1+N(e2)) (1)
where:
n – corrected sample size,
N – number of seafarers,
e – margin of error (MoE).
We estimate the number of active
seafarers equaling 100 hundred thousand seafarers. For research purpose, the
margin of error is taken= +/- 5%. So, in this case, a minimum number of
respondents would be: n=100000/(1+100000(0,052)
; after simple calculation, we will get a number n=398 seafarers. For accuracy, all
respondents were officers of deck and engine departments (Table 2).
Tab. 2
Survey results of
respondents of different age groups
No |
Age of respondents |
Experience at sea in years |
Official rank |
Quantity of
respondents |
Percentage of
respondents |
1 |
20-30 |
0-10 |
Officers |
270 |
67,8 % |
2 |
30-50 |
10-20 |
Officers |
112 |
28,2% |
3 |
Over 50 |
20-30 |
Officers |
16 |
04,0% |
All of the respondents filled
anonymous questionnaires, which were later evaluated by the researchers.
There were five questions in the
survey:
1. Did you study situational awareness
in marine school? (Figure 5);
2. Did you study situational awareness
during your training at maritime training centers? (Figure 6);
3. Do you know how to evaluate the
situation, its algorithm and procedure? (Figure 7);
4. Do you know the factors that form
the mental picture of decision making?
(Figure 8);
5. Which data is more reliable for the
assessment of collision: Radar or AIS? (Figure 9).
The result was well estimated
because the requirement for the study of human element was inserted in the
educational program after the Manila conference in 2010. Seafarers that
graduated from marine educational centers before 2010 did not study this
subject. The term “Human Element” is a part of the subject
“Maritime Resource Management” and logistically should be studied
by the cadets in marine educational centers. On the other hand, the value of
affirmative answers (21,5%) of those respondent groups sounded a serious alarm
for the general quality of the educational process. Furthermore, respondents
from the second group could not help denying the compulsory requirements by
STCW-78, as amended (Regulation I/11) and national requirements of refreshing
educational and training courses. The latest reports showed that updating
courses, programs and probably instructors do not duly respond to the
international requirements stated in the IMO resolutions.
Fig. 5. Understanding situational
awareness during the educational process
Fig. 6. Study of situational
awareness in seafarers' training centers
Obtained figures confirmed the fact
that the quality of training conducted in Ukraine contradicts current
international requirements. We are talking about requirements of IMO model
courses 1.21, 1.39, 1.40 which in black and white requires considering factors
of the human element indicated in them when organizing and conducting
trainings. The lack of this knowledge leads both to a decrease in the quality
of expertise in training centers and a decrease in the level of competence of
seafarers. Such an approach in the organization of training and educational
processes in Ukraine fully compromises the requirements stated in the STCW-78,
as amended, as far as the IMO Resolution A.947(23) “Human Element Vision,
Principles and Goals for the Organization” dated November 27, 2003.
Obtained results confirmed the
following facts:
- proper situational awareness can be developed by
experience (100% of respondents over 50 years old stated that they understand
the algorithm and procedure of situational awareness);
- respondents of the group 30-50 years old did not study
this factor either in a marine school or in a seafarer’s training center
(with exception of a small number of respondents), some of them were not able to develop the sense of
situational awareness due to lack of experience (46.4%);
- respondents of the group 18-30 years old showed a
better understanding of the term (64,4%), they probably had some knowledge or
training; nevertheless, 35,6% of respondents did not know how to deal with
situational awareness. In other words, confusion, loss of self-control among
the representatives of this group due to unsatisfactory quality of education
and simulator’s training, is expected.
Fig. 7. Situation assessment of
situational awareness algorithm and sequence of actions
Fig. 8. Understanding the factors
that shape the mental picture of decision making
Again, the results of this research
revealed a gap. Generally, it is related to all groups of respondents. In other
words, our respondents' knowledge and skills are distant from the industry
requirements and do not work to improve maritime safety. In addition, it should
be recalled that in evaluating the answers of the respondents, it was observed
that some respondents, for whatever reason, gave a positive answer to the
questions, which would worsen the results of the questionnaire.
Fig. 9. Preference of devices for
collision assessment: Radar or AIS?
Result of the questionnaire shows
that all age groups have academic knowledge and training skills, which do not
meet the requirements of the STCW-78 or IMO model courses. This
misunderstanding could seriously compromise a ship’s safety during routine
maneuvering to avoid a collision. The case of the collision of the Norwegian
warship “Helge Ingstad” readily
comes to mind. A 5,290 tons frigate
was completely sunk to the bottom of a Norwegian fjord after smashing into a
Maltese flagged oil tanker “Sola” off the coast of the Scandinavian
country near Bergen on November 08, 2018. Eight people were injured in the
crash. The main reason for this collision is the lack of situational awareness
caused by insufficient knowledge of principles of the marine radar with automatic
radar plotting aid (ARPA) work by the female-gender crew of the Norwegian's
frigate. The direct losses exceeded 700 million dollars. Having evaluated the
answers of the Ukrainian seafarers and cadets, we could not assume that the
Ukrainian seafarers would be able to avoid collision under the same
circumstances, because their answers showed the same problem.
4. CONCLUSION
Because the respondents worked in
different companies or were educated in different training centers, they had
different levels of experience and different sets of professional skills. The
obtained data allows us to believe that the answers of our respondents can be
regarded as a lack of basic knowledge about the phenomenon of situational
awareness, as well as a lack of skills due to insufficient training in the
training center. The results obtained in the course of the survey clearly show
significant shortcomings in planning and implementation of seafarers' training
at the maritime educational institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to focus
on improving the level of training of both ship crewmembers and instructors, by
including new training modules to study certain elements of the human factor in
the training program. The existing
system of seafarers' training generally meets the needs of the shipping
industry; however, given the constant updating of international requirements to
ensure the safety of navigation, new requirements to the training of crews and
masters of seagoing ships should be formed, therefore, the approaches to the
range of courses and programs offered should similarly change.
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Received 15.10.2021; accepted in revised form 09.12.2021
Scientific
Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport is licensed
under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
[1] Department of
Navigation and Maritime Security, Odesa National Maritime University, Mechnikov
34 Street, 65029 Odesa, Ukraine. Email: m.onmu@ukr.net. ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9228-8459
[2] Department of
Navigation and Maritime Security, Odesa National Maritime University, Mechnikov
34 Street, 65029 Odesa, Ukraine. Email: seastranger55@gmail.com. ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1459-9029
[3] Department of
Navigation and Maritime Security, Odesa National Maritime University, Mechnikov
34 Street, 65029 Odesa, Ukraine. Email: voloshin61@gmail.com. ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3993-5826