Article citation information:
Blišťanová,
M., Kešeľová, M., Brůnová, Ľ. A
systematic review of Safety Management System (SMS) in aviation with a focus on
the safety level. Scientific Journal of
Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport. 2021, 113, 29-43. ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2021.113.3.
Monika BLIŠŤANOVÁ[1],
Michaela KEŠEĽOVÁ[2],
Ľubomíra BRŮNOVÁ3
A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) IN AVIATION WITH A
FOCUS ON THE SAFETY LEVEL
Summary. Safety is
generally characterised as the state of being “safe”, the condition
of being protected from harm or other non-desirable consequences. One effective
way of achieving it is to implement a safety management system (SMS). SMS
should be seen as an aggregate strategic aspect of standard business
management, understanding its high priority to safety. This article describes
and illustrates SMS in aviation, focusing on the similarities and differences
in the system approaches adopted by selected Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs)
with the primary focus on the safety level. The main goal is to provide a
structural comparison of the system framework within individual CAAs and its
explanation in safety-related documents. This article also dealt with the
chosen safety approach (reactive, proactive and predictive) and safety
performance indicators (SPIs), forming a quality and effective safety system
that maintains an acceptable safety level. Finally, this article is mainly
based on datasets publicly available through the International Civil Aviation
Organisation, Transport Canada, Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia,
Federal Aviation Administration, UK Civil Aviation Authority, Civil Aviation
Administration of China and Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand websites
and documentation related to safety.
Keywords: safety
management system, SMS framework, SMS approach
1.
INTRODUCTION
Many
authors characterised safety as the state in which the chance of harm to
persons or property damage is decreased and maintained at or under an
acceptable (adequate) level within continuing hazard identification and risk
management [18, 25-27, 40]. Air safety and its improvement have constantly been
the highest priority for the airline industry, and achieving an adequate air
safety record is essential to an airline's success [23].
Safety Management System (SMS) presents a framework of methodologies,
specifications, and mechanisms that help organisations understand safety
principles, create and customise a management framework ideal for accomplishing
each organisation's required safety outcomes. Even though safety management was
a preferred mechanism to improve occupational health and safety, it has
developed into a much more complete system including psychological,
organisational, social, and technological approaches to safety and systems
thinking [231].
A safety system is created to continuously improve safety by identifying
hazards, managing and examining data and continually evaluate safety risks. The
SMS attempts to proactively check or mitigate threats before they appear in
aviation accidents and incidents. It is a system that is comparable to the
organisation's regulatory obligations and safety goals [17]. The International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) characterised SMS as a "systematic
approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures,
accountabilities, policies and procedures" [15]. This definition also
represents a conventional interpretation of the term "safety management
system" and is reflected in almost every other description. Aviation is
becoming a regulatory requirement. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) need to
find methods to manage safety management activities to achieve means to show
compliance with actual regulations [239].
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Transport Canada (TC),
Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia (CASA), Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the UK Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA), Civil Aviation
Administration of China (CAAC), CAA New Zealand (CAA NZ) have made significant
progress in the development, implementation, and refinement of SMS. Selected
aviation authorities also provide a clear and accurate picture of the system in
place and its features.
2. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES (CAAS)
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (ICAO)
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was founded in 1947 and it is a specific agency of the United Nations. To ensure safe and organised development, it modifies the principles and techniques of international air navigation and promotes international air transport planning and development. The ICAO Council adopts guidelines and recommended practices for international civil aviation in air traffic, facilities, flight inspection, unlawful intrusion prevention, and border-crossing procedures [20]. The Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859), which was published in 2006, is intended to assist ICAO Contracting States in fulfilling the specifications of Annexes 6, 11 and 14 regarding introducing SMS by operators and service providers. In the guidance manual, ICAO suggests individual and proper steps for combining the different elements into a unified SMS as a beginning and operating an effective process for safety management [19]. The manual's primary objectives are to help States transition to a performance-based safety approach; put in place safety-related information-protection tools, and achieve the goals set out in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). The latest edition of the Safety Management Manual (SMM) is its fourth and is complemented by a unique website (www.icao.int/smi). The website contains some examples and resources from the third edition of the SMM and additional practical examples, tools, and instructional materials that are compiled, revised and updated regularly [15, 21]. SMS is the topic of Annex 19, which was first published in July 2013 (and became effective in November 2013) [6]. Annex 19 presents standards for implementing and maintaining a State Safety Programme (SSP) by States and providing a SMS by relevant service providers included in the various services and industries in aviation [5]. Annex 19 applies to safety management functions that are directly connected to or facilitate aircraft's safe operation. It lays out a broad collection of specifications that are not specific to any aviation role, service provider, or organisation. Per ICAO Annex 19, Edition 2, Chapter 4, the Safety Management System of a service provider shall be established following the framework elements and be proportional to the service provider's size and the complexity of its aviation products and services [6].
TRANSPORT CANADA (TC)
The Department of Transport was
formed in 1935 by Canada's government to understand Canada's changing
transportation environment. Transport Canada is the department in the
Government of Canada that is accountable for developing regulations, policies
and services of all transportation types in Canada. It merges transportation
departments: road, rail, marine, aviation and transportation security in
general. It is a federal institution responsible for transportation policies,
systems and programmes. They support secure,
safe, effective and environmentally responsible transportation. Transport
Canada is responsible for licensing pilots and other aviation professionals and
registering and inspecting aircraft. Additionally, it is in charge of safety
certification and constant safety oversight of most commercial operations.
Transport Canada's Civil Aviation (TCCA) Directorate is Canada's civil aviation
authority [37]. Since the 2000s, Canada's Commercial and Aircraft Maintenance
and Manufacturing Branch have published corrections to the Canadian Aviation
Regulations (CAR) requiring SMS establishment in certain operations types [19].
In 2001, the first material related to SMS was published as Introduction to SMS
(TP13739 E) [34]. The guidance material Safety Management Systems for flight
operations and aircraft maintenance organisation (TP13881 E) was published in
2002 to explain the recommended regulatory requirements' purpose and use [35].
The practical guide to the implementation of Safety Management Systems for
small aviation operations (TP14135 E) was published in 2004 to explain SMS in
simple operations [36]. These materials are designed as operational guidelines for defining,
developing and implementing an SMS within the flight, maintenance operations
and small aviation operations. In 2008, Advisory Circular (AC) No. 107-001 -
Guidance on Safety Management Systems Development was published as guidance on
SMS's ways to be implemented in large, complex organisations. This guidance
material interprets the application of the SMS regulatory requirements. It
contains valuable examples and models of how the elements that make up an SMS
might be achieved and gives an evaluation tool for understanding whether an
organisation reaches the minor regulatory requirements [38]. In 2016, Advisory Circular (AC) No. 107-002 – Safety Management
System Development Guide for Smaller Aviation Organisations was published to
help small-sized aviation organisations implement an SMS. It has the same
content as a guide for large organisations but related to small ones [3].
CIVIL AVIATION
SAFETY AUTHORITY AUSTRALIA (CASA)
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the national authority for civil aviation regulation in Australia. It was founded in 1995 when the air safety functions of the former Civil Aviation Authority of Australia were separated from the air traffic control's other regulatory role. CASA is accountable for controlling and monitoring civil air operations in Australia, issuing proper licences, enforcing and implementing safety requirements, and preserving the environment from aircraft use impacts. Its mission is to develop a positive and collaborative safety culture within a good, effective and efficient aviation safety regulatory system, supporting and helping the aviation community. CASA is a government organisation that manages aviation safety and the operation in Australia and aircraft overseas. CASA licence pilots, list and register aircraft, manage safety and increase safety awareness in aviation. Furthermore, It is responsible for ensuring that its airspace is controlled and used safely [10]. Because of the importance of SMS, CASA published a draft AC119-165 in 2002 to help establish course criteria for the preparation and training of safety managers as required to implementing and managing the SMS. In 2005, an AC 172-01(0) was published to provide general principles and practical guidance to illustrate SMS requirements compliance. In addition, CASA issued two guidance materials that described, more specifically, the work of CEOs in the implementation of SMS [19]. Recently, CASA published the Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) as guidance material of Safety Management Systems for Regular Public Transport Operations CAAP SMS-01 v1.1 [8].
FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION (FAA)
The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is the biggest improved transportation agency and governmental
organisation that manages every aspect of civil aviation in the United States
and over its neighbouring international waters. It was founded in 1958 and its
capabilities cover the development and operation of airports, air traffic
control, the certification of pilots, other professionals and aircraft, and the
protection of assets during the launch or re-entry of commercial space vehicles
[39]. In 2006, FAA published Advisory Circular AC120-92 - Introduction to
Safety Management Systems for Air Operators to introduce the SMS concept for
the first time to airlines and other air transport operators and guide SMS
improvement by aviation service providers. FAA indicates that a circular is not
obligatory and does not create a regulation; for example, SMS implementation is
optional [19]. This circular described SMS as an organisation-wide comprehensive
and preventive method for managing and achieving safety. An SMS also ensures
the overall safety performance of the organisation [38]. SMS presents an evolutionary method
in operation safety and safety management. It is a structured method that
forces organisations to maintain safety with the corresponding preference that
other core business processes are handled. This applies to internal (FAA) and
external aviation industry organisations (Operator and Product Service
Provider) [16]. In 2020, FAA published ORDER 8000.369C - Safety Management
System, which establishes policy and requirements. The requirements included
within this order are meant to assist organisations in incorporating SMS into
their organisations [28].
UK CIVIL AVIATION
AUTHORITY (CAA)
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) is a government
corporation of the Department for Transport that was founded in 1972. The UK
CAA is the legal corporation that directly or indirectly oversees, regulates
and manages all civil aviation aspects in the United Kingdom. As the UK's
aviation regulator, CAA works to meet the highest safety standards in the
aviation industry, protect all customers when they fly and manage security
risks effectively. Most aviation regulation and policy are arranged worldwide
to guarantee consistent safety and consumer protection levels [38]. The United
Kingdom National Air Traffic Services (NATS) started introducing standard SMS
in 1991, primarily because of the growing attention on safety concerns and
airspace capacity from outside groups as the public, media and the UK
Parliament. In 2002, the UK Civil Aviation Authority's Safety Regulation Group
(SRG) published one of the first introductory Civil Aviation Publication (CAP)
712 – Safety Management Systems for Commercial Air Transport Operations
as a guidebook. An SMS was described as an exact component of the corporate
management responsibility, which sets out a company's safety policy and
determines how it intends to manage safety as an integral part of its overall
business [19]. In 2015 was published the Safety Management System (SMS)
guidance for organisations – CAP 795. This document aims to guide the
implementation of SMS. It has been developed to understand the SMS concept and
develop management methods and processes to implement, manage and achieve a
good SMS. It applies and implements to air operators, airworthiness management
organisations and maintenance organisations, air navigation service providers,
aerodromes and accredited training organisations. This guidance material meets
the ICAO Annex 19 requirements and is a UK CAA alternative to compliance with
the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) management system requirements
regarding safety management. SMS continues beyond compliance with prescriptive
directions to a systematic approach where potential and possible safety risks
are identified and controlled to an acceptable level. SMS uses a business-like
approach to safety, safety plans, safety performance indicators(SPIs) and
targets, and constant monitoring of its safety performance. It allows efficient
risk-based decision-making processes over the business [8].
CIVIL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA (CAAC)
The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) is the
aviation authority under the Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of
China. It was formed in 1949 to manage all non-military aviation in the country
and provide general and commercial flight service. As a national civil
authority, it oversees civil aviation and investigates aviation accidents and
incidents. Its principal functions are to ensure the development of long-term
plans and strategies for the civil aviation industry; formulate rules and
regulations; implement particular suggestions linked to the whole system of
transport; regulate the responsibility of flight and ground safety and ensure
the safety of civil aviation [32]. CAAC began SMS development and trial in
2005. From 2013 to 2014, CAAC reviewed the national safety programme linking
and drafted the official Rules of Civil Aviation Safety Management following
Annex 19 and Doc 9859 for improved safety performance management. To implement the ICAO Safety Management
Concept, help the efficient implementation of SMS in China, and guarantee the
integrity and uniformity of safety management standards, CAAC published the
first complete Civil Aviation Safety Management Regulation Safety Regulation.
Verification of SMS requirements mandated by CAAC is given in Requirements on
Safety Management Systems of Air Operators (AC-121/135), Regulation of Airport
Operation Safety and Management (CCAR-140), Rules on Safety Management of Air
Traffic Control Units (CCAR-83), Safety Management Systems of Maintenance
Organisations (AC-145-15), additional laws or regulating documents.
Today, airlines, airports, ATS providers and maintenance organisations in China
have implemented SMS following the ICAO rules and standardised ICAO SMS
framework. In addition, CAAC supports the implementation of SMS in companies
responsible for designing or manufacturing aerospace products. Due to the rapid
increase in air traffic, CAAC has been investigating and innovating safety
oversight procedures and is prepared to promote civil aviation authorities
worldwide. Further, CAAC has introduced a specific strategy to the direction of
airline operators. In 2018, the Guidelines on Differentiated Supervision of the
Safety of Certified Operators and the Implementation Procedures for Differentiated
Supervision of the Safety of Certified Operators were issued. Both regulations
define the complex importance of air traffic assessment, current safety
assessment and the current safety oversight classification [22]. It is
necessary to point out that it is difficult to get documents that directly
refer to the SMS and its framework as these documents are in Chinese. Based on
the information found, it will be assumed that the SMS structure under CAAC is
the same as the standard ICAO structure.
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEW ZEALAND (CAA
NZ)
The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA New
Zealand) was founded in 1992 as the "most recent" of this article's
aviation authorities. It is the state agency charged with developing civil
aviation safety and security standards and approaches in New Zealand. CAA
further controls the implementation and usage of standards and is accountable
for enforcement proceedings. It provides accident and incident investigations,
certification, inspection, auditing and other activities and collates
industry-wide safety picture. The Civil Aviation Authority is a top entity
accountable to the Minister of Transport. Civil aviation in New Zealand works
within a system founded and managed by the Civil Aviation Act 1990 [12]. CAA
New Zealand issued Advisory circular Ac 00-4 Safety Management Systems in
December 2012 to give complete guidance material to support Part 119, 139, 145
and 172 organisations implement an SMS. Additionally, its released series of
four booklets makes part of the "resource kit". The kit contains
valuable advice and information about improving current systems and describes
and illustrates the moves that can be taken to successfully, regularly, and
proactively manage safety. The first booklet includes advice to organisations
about enhancing safety systems and supplement mechanisms and methods to perform
the best safety outcomes. The
second booklet presents an enhancement guide that helps from Quality Management
Systems (QMS) to Safety Management systems (SMS). The third booklet supports
implementing SMS as guidelines for small aviation organisations, and the last
one is the introduction to aviation risk management [13].
3.
COMPARISON: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN SMS FRAMEWORK
Modern
SMS can be defined as a collection of activities considered necessary actions
to fulfil responsibilities under the new age of self-regulation delegated
responsibility [33]. The definitions of SMS in air transport differ depending
on the system's approach and perception of CAAs (Tab.
1.
).
Definition of SMS
ICAO |
systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures [19] |
TC |
explicit, comprehensive, and proactive process for managing risks that integrates operations and technical systems with financial and human resource management for all activities [2] |
CASA |
systematic approach to managing safety, including organisational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures [8] |
FAA |
the formal, top-down, organisation-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls [388] |
UK CAA |
a systematic and proactive approach to managing safety risks [8] |
CAAC |
systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures [19, 22] |
CAA NZ |
a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures [13] |
It
can be observed that SMS definitions in some point of view differ significantly
from each other, although the whole system's meaning and essence do not
conflict. The definitions of ICAO, CASA, CAAC, CAA New Zealand (NZ), which are
marked "bold" (Tab.
1.
), are the most consistent and characterised SMS in the same way as a systematic approach to managing safety. The UK CAA describes this system directly related to the risk management contained in it and emphasises a proactive approach to risk management. TC and FAA define the system differently, which is reflected in the components and elements of this system. On the other hand, these definitions also highlight proactivity and risk management, effective and explicit. The SMS structure is mainly based on the ICAO SMS guidance [8].
The ICAO-specified system (
Fig. 1) for implementing and maintaining an SMS has a safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, safety promotion plus, a minimum of twelve elements that are an integral part of each component, and each element is further sub-divided to help the organisation and CAA evaluate the system. This standard structure has been divided into two fundamental units for this article, ensuring system management and an acceptable level of safety.
Fig. 1. Standard ICAO framework and its divisions
The system can be tailored to each organisation's company's complexity and nature [6, 30]. Every Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) explains the safety outcomes and the key components and elements of an SMS.
Summarily, results (Tab. 2.) in similarities and differences present comparable SMS components based on various documents published by CAAs and organisations. A significant difference in the SMS components is shown by Transport Canada (TC), as it has a different structure than the classic ICAO framework and, at the same time, complements it with the safety management plan, documentation, safety overview, training, quality assurance and emergency response plan. Although the individual components have different names, they essentially reflect the primary structure and goals to be achieved.
Similarities and differences in SMS components
|
ICAO |
TC |
CASA |
FAA |
UK CAA |
CAAC |
CAA NZ |
Safety policy |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Safety risk management |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Safety assurance |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Safety promotion |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Safety management plan |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Documentation |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Safety overview |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Training |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Quality assurance |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Emergency response plan |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Furthermore, it is possible to see changes in the individual elements (Tab. 3.), which differs and complements the SMS depending on the country’s perception of safety and SMS definition. The most significant difference can be observed in TC, where the structure of the elements differs significantly.
Similarities and differences in SMS elements
|
ICAO |
TC |
CASA |
FAA |
UK CAA |
CAAC |
CAA NZ |
Management commitment and responsibility |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
NO |
Safety accountabilities |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Appointment of key safety personnel |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
NO |
Coordination of an emergency response plan |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
SMS documentation |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Hazard identification |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Safety risk assessment and mitigation |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
NO |
Safety performance monitoring and measurement |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Management of change |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Continuous improvement of SMS |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Audit |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
✓ |
Training and education |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Safety communication |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
SMS implementation plan |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Third party investigation |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Internal safety investigations |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
Safety policy |
NO |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Non-punitive safety reporting policy |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Roles, responsibilities and employee involvement |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Safety objectives, planning and goals |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Management review |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
Identification and maintenance of applicable regulations |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Records management |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Reactive processes |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Proactive processes |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Investigation and analysis |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
Operational QA |
NO |
✓ |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
Risk management |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
NO |
✓ |
4. LEVEL OF SAFETY
ICAO
describes safety as the state in which the likelihood of harm to a person or
property damage is decreased to and maintained at or under an acceptable level
through ongoing hazard identification and safety risk management. The
definition includes the word risk, characterised as a combination of likelihood
and severity of harm. The definition also refers to acceptable levels of risk,
proposing the presence of a threshold that distinguishes between safe and
unsafe states [14]. Total safety is usually an
unachievable and costly goal. Thus, the idea of acceptable safety has been used
in risk-bearing industries, including aviation. The unambiguous ICAO definition for an
acceptable level of safety expresses the safety goals of an oversight
authority, an operator, or a services provider. The relationship between
oversight authorities and operators/services providers provides the minimum
safety objective(s) acceptable to the oversight authority, achieved by the
operators/services providers while conducting their core business functions [4].
Typically, in aviation, safety regulation are been carried out. The regulator
outlines the standards to be followed and uses audit and inspection to check
compliance with them.
Safety
management is a systematic activity and, in this way, helps to achieve safety
goals systematically.
The SMS
risk management pillar ensures identifying, assessing, and controlling risk
proactively as the purpose of an SMS. Risk management is characterised as a
coordinated activity to direct or manage an organisation about risk. It allows
an organisation to ensure that risk remains at an acceptable level through a
consistent and proactive framework.
The SMS
safety assurance pillar directs the monitoring of safety indicators and the
evaluation of safety performance. The concept of an acceptable level of safety
is represented by two specific metrics, namely:
•
safety
performance targets and
•
SPIs.
Safety performance targets support
to assure the achievement of the principle safety objective, includes one or
more SPIs, mutually with wanted results displayed in those indicators. The
wanted safety target (outcome) may be presented either in absolute or relative
terms. For instance: a desired safety outcome, expressed in absolute terms, is:
less than one fatal accident per 1 000 000 operating hours.
SPIs help measure and demonstrate
that the achieved level of safety meets the targets. They are directly linked
to safety performance targets. In general, SPIs are presented in terms of the
frequency of harmful event(s). For instance: the number of severe aircraft
incidents per 100 000 flight hours. SPIs are categorised as "lagging"
or "leading".
Leading indicators are circumstances
that lead to an unwanted event (accident, incident, undesirable safety state)
and have value in predicting the arrival of the event.
Lagging indicators are measures of a
system that are taken following events, which measure consequences and
incidents. It suggests that leading indicators are seen as inputs while lagging
indicators are viewed as outputs from a safety viewpoint. Consequently, all
indicators might be characterised as both leading and lagging depending on
their place in the process [14].
The relationship
between an acceptable level of safety, safety performance targets and SPIs, and
safety requirements is as follows [15]:
The whole system is
therefore interconnected and continuous.
5. RESULTS
This article aimed to provide a
systematic review of the SMS approach adopted by selected Civil Aviation
Authorities (CAAs) with the primary focus on the safety level. Many aviation
organisations and CAAs have made efforts to develop SMS and make it an official
requirement. In this article, all significant CAAs globally, such as ICAO, TC,
CASA, FAA, UK CAA, CAAC, CAA NZ were selected and compared in components and
elements in the SMS framework. The summary of the results is shown in Tab. 4..
Summary of results
CAA |
Components |
Elements |
Document |
ICAO |
4 |
12 |
Doc. 9859 |
TC |
6 |
17 |
(AC) 107-00 |
CASA |
4 |
15 |
CAAPSMS-01 |
FAA |
4 |
- |
Or.8000_369C |
UK CAA |
4 |
12 |
CAP 795 |
CAAC |
4 |
12 |
AC-121/135 |
CAA NZ |
4 |
13 |
AC 00-4 |
These further results show (Tab. 4.) that the SMS structure is mainly based on the ICAO SMS guidance,
consisting of four major components: safety policy, safety risk management,
safety assurance and safety promotion. It is possible to see a notable
difference in the Transport Canada components, supplemented by other features.
In principle, however, the structure of SMS in Canada is the same, only the
components are named differently. The universally held SMS framework includes
components and key elements describing SMS requirement – especially
elements varying depending on the CAA strategy. Although there are noticeable
differences, especially in the number of elements, it can be stated that all
the main topics are incorporated in each of the described documents, though not
in the same place and not in separate elements. Increased consideration needs
to be given to the requirements to ensure the system's efficiency and focus on
improving safety (safety level). SMS becomes effective by incorporating all
components. According to [7], the core of an efficient SMS is Safety Risk
Management (SRM). It deals with hazard identification, risk evaluation and risk
mitigation. SMS also illustrates three management approaches: reactive,
proactive and predictive. These are precisely linked to SRM and safety
assurance (the third component, which includes safety monitoring and
measurements). SMS requires data to provide possible results, and methodologies
are an SMS mechanism that obtains the necessary safety data.
• The reactive approach collects safety data from accidents
and incidents that have already happened and learns from their consequences. As
mandatory reports are drawn up after the event, necessary occurrence reporting
can be classified as a reactive safety data collection methodology.
•
The proactive approach uses
safety reporting systems and SPIs to collect safety data to discover and
mitigate possible threats and hazards that could trigger accidents or
incidents.
•
The predictive approach is
not well organised. It intends to identify viable and potential risks based on
predictive analyses (or forecasts) that obtain information from historical and
current safety data and predict trends and behaviour patterns of emerging
hazards.
Each of the three approaches is
specific to safety management, that is, depending on SMS development in a
particular organisation. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages; the
recommendation is to proceed from reactive through proactive to the predictive
approach.
Therefore, the last part of this
article deals with which approach (reactive, proactive or predictive) was
chosen, respectively, what approach is recommended and adopted by selected
CAAs. Based on the information obtained, it was possible to see the results (Tab. 5.), which showed that even though most have a reactive and proactive
approach, only CASA and CAA NZ actively apply a predictive approach. The
literature [23] describes SPIs as “lagging” or
“leading”. As was mentioned, leading indicators present situations
that lead to unwanted circumstances and can predict the arrival of an event,
and lagging indicators are measures to measuring results and circumstances.
Furthermore, almost every CAA recommended establishing SPIs in safety-related
documents. ICAO, CAAC and CAA NZ deal with these indicators in more detail,
specifying the use of individual indicators, and TC and FAA do not widely deal
with them in their documents.
Approach and safety performance indicators
|
ICAO |
TC |
CASA |
FAA |
UK CAA |
CAAC |
CAA NZ |
Safety
performance indicators (SPIs) |
|||||||
should be
established |
✓ |
|
✓ |
|
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
Lagging |
✓ |
|
|
|
|
✓ |
✓ |
Leading |
✓ |
|
|
|
|
✓ |
✓ |
Risk
management approach |
|||||||
reactive |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
proactive |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
✓ |
predictive |
|
|
✓ |
|
|
|
✓ |
6. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that the whole
system, regardless of where it is used and applied, represents a unique
improvement direction for ensuring safety. SMS focuses on maximising
opportunities to improve the aviation system's overall safety continuously. The
whole approach builds on current procedures, integrate with other management
frameworks and shows good corporate practice by tailoring a compliant
regulatory environment to the enterprise. This article analysed the basic
structure of the SMS of selected CAAs. CAAs were chosen based on prior
knowledge of each country and the assumption that there is a high level of
safety awareness. The primary safety-related documents were searched and the
standard SMS structure was compared among individual CAAs, and the results were
summarised in tables. The standard SMS structure does not differ significantly
in most countries, although interpretation may vary. The individual components
and elements are essentially interdependent and function as one complete
system. At the same time, the results indicated that the standard ICAO
structure represents a generic model, which is implemented and supplemented
depending on the overall perception of safety in the country. The next part of
the article dealt with the level of safety and how to reach its acceptable
level. For this purpose, the standard SMS structure was also divided into two
units, dealing with system management and level of safety. It is necessary to deal with the
system's structure, the safety performance targets and SPIs that help assess
and ensure an acceptable level of safety. A system is primarily reactive,
proactive and predictive; however, the reactive and proactive system is applied
more often than the predictive. Safety performance targets and safety performance
indicators help to improve and enhance the whole SMS. Although the results show
that this area is more of a recommendation or suggestion, not every CAA gives
priority to it. Implementation of SMS describes a fundamental change in the way
all organisations do business. Based on the results, it can be stated that all
selected aviation authorities have a well-developed system that meets the
requirement to implement the system. Furthermore, it is also possible to tell
that although the standard structure of SMS does not change and is applied,
less emphasis is placed on safety performance targets and safety performance
indicators, which support the quality and efficiency of the system. Although,
it should be highlighted that most aviation authorities depart from the primary
system established by ICAO, not least because all countries (Canada, Australia,
the USA, the United Kingdom, China and New Zealand) are member states.
In conclusion, safety becomes an
essential part of the organisation's operations. However, for SMS to be
successful, every CAA must establish a disciplinary and enforcement policy that
promotes and rewards behaviours for achieving it. The most positive benefit of
SMS is its improvement of the current levels of aviation safety in the knowledge
of the industry's continuing growth.
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Received 05.09.2021; accepted in
revised form 29.10.2021
Scientific Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series
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License
[1] Faculty of Aeronautics, Technical university
of Kosice, Rampova 7 Street, 041 21 Kosice, Slovakia. Email: monika.blistanova@tuke.sk. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0349-1864
[2] Faculty of Aeronautics, Technical university
of Kosice, Rampova 7 Street, 041 21 Kosice, Slovakia. Email: michaela.keselova@tuke.sk. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3643-6880
3 Faculty of Aeronautics, Technical
university of Kosice, Rampova 7 Street, 041 21 Kosice, Slovakia. Email: lubomira.brunova@tuke.sk.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1736-8920