Article
citation information:
Angelov, I. “Pooling and
sharing” or “intelligent defence”
in the field of security. Scientific
Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport. 2019, 105, 15-25. ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2019.105.2.
Ivaylo ANGELOV[1]
“POOLING
AND SHARING” OR “INTELLIGENT DEFENCE” IN THE FIELD OF
SECURITY
Summary. The European Union is focusing on military
capabilities and the fight against terrorism, but to a lesser extent on
employment opportunities for immigrant integration, human rights and
peace-building and the sustainability of countries and societies in Europe and
around it. The European Union has always been proud of its soft power and will
continue to do so in the area of security and defence. On the other hand, the
idea of Europe as an extremely “civilian power” does not correspond
to the changing reality. In this regard, the EU will need to deepen its
transatlantic relationship and its partnership with NATO.
Keywords: pooling and sharing,
intelligent defence, security, defence
1. INTRODUCTION
None of the countries in the world has the power or
resources to deal with threats alone and to take advantage of the opportunities
of our time. In these difficult times, a strong alliance is one who thinks
strategically, shares a common vision and acts together. The aim of the European Union is to
play a major role on a global scale as a guarantor of global security. However,
to be able to meet the needs of its citizens and make its partnerships fruitful,
it should work together and unite with other players in the field of security
and defence.
The European Union is focusing on military
capabilities and the fight against terrorism, but to a lesser extent on
employment opportunities for immigrant integration, human rights and
peace-building and the sustainability of countries and societies in Europe and
around it. The European Union has always been proud of its soft power and will
continue to do so in the area of security and defence.
On the other hand, the idea of Europe as an extremely “civilian power”
does not correspond to the changing reality. In this regard, the EU needs to
deepen its transatlantic relationship and its partnership with NATO.
A look at the key NATO and EU security and defence documents, confirms that the Berlin plus agreements
are the basis for the practical interaction between NATO and the EU in crisis
management operations. The Berlin plus agreement enables NATO structures,
mechanisms and tools to be used to conduct European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions.
The EU and NATO interaction in the field of
security under analysis clearly indicates the need for an in-depth observation
between the relationship of the two alliances and the processes of
post-conflict recovery and crisis resolution.
On this basis, conclusions can be drawn on whether
the modern security environment implies a better interaction between the EU and
NATO, which in turn will contribute to the need to strategically rethink the
security environment and modernise the European
Security Strategy.
2. INTERACTION
BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO IN POST-CONFLICT PROCESSING AND CRITICISING
CRISIS
Present post-conflict recovery and
crisis resolution are important in terms of non-military means and in view of
the new EU Lisbon Treaty provisions.
The process of post-conflict
recovery includes diplomatic, political, military and economic factors. Efforts
should be directed on the one hand to ensuring stability and ending
hostilities, and on the other hand, to national and international factors that,
in the long run, coordinate peace by effective justice and reforms in the
institutions and economies of a given country. Ensuring security as a major task is
linked to both disarmament and the process of reforms in this area, which in
most cases involves the creation of a new organisational
structure for the army, border guards and police.
The next aspect is the process
of reforming the judiciary, establishing the rule of law, protecting human
rights and prosecuting the culprits, respectively. The challenge of this process lies in
the coordination of the various measures that would be taken to stabilise the countries in the short and long terms and
which should be accepted and supported by the majority of the population[2].
After the fall of the Berlin
Wall within NATO, a process of adapting policies, strategy, military potential
and internal structure to the new geopolitical realities began. In the adopted
treaty in April 1999, NATO's strategy declared Alliance support for economic
recovery and democracy in regions affected by armed conflicts, as well as the
determination to participate in the post-conflict reconstruction process. According to the NATO concept,
peacekeeping operations are multifunctional and they comprise a set of
political, economic, social and military measures to eradicate the negative
consequences of the conflict and subsequent stabilisation.
The establishment of the
European Security and Defence Policy within the
framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy is linked to a
commitment by the Community to participate in a number of peacekeeping
missions. At this stage, however, there is still a lack of full
coordination between the different European institutions and the Member States
regarding European foreign policy. Only after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty
were steps taken in this direction, given the innovations related to the
extension of the so- Petersburg tasks with peacekeeping and post-conflict
recovery missions.
With a view to deepening co-operation
in crisis management, a consistent approach was sought to mutually strengthen
and uphold the autonomy of decision-making of both organisations
– NATO and the EU.
In this connection, progress
has been made at the political level. There was an intense Ashton-Rasmussen dialogue, their
participation in meetings of the respective organisation
and joint meetings on the Middle East situation. The tradition of dialogue was
adopted by their successors, Mogerini - Stoltenberg.
Regarding operations, an exchange
of basic planning documents, the provision of EU material from the NATO
Satellite Center, and day-to-day contacts at the operational level are monitored when
the two organisations work together in a particular
region.
Concerning the development of
military capabilities, there exist strong political interests on both sides to
avoid duplication of forces and resources, given the serious financial
constraints that are of particular importance.
Based on the above, in order
to ensure a targeted response and crisis management to fill the gap between
heavy military intervention and long-term stabilisation
and recovery initiatives, member states need to “capitalise”
and take advantage of the wide range of instruments, which the Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP)
provides. The establishment and
development of stable working EU-NATO relations help to improve the realisation of their joint goals in the field of security.
Considering the current financial restrictions, it is necessary to ensure that
NATO intelligent defence initiatives and EU pooling
and sharing capabilities are complementary and supportive.
3. EU “UNION AND SHARING”
INSTITUTIONS AND NATO “INTELLIGENT DEFENCE” INSTITUTIONS
The modern security
environment implies better synergy, successful cooperation and complementarity
between NATO and the EU through intelligent defence,
pooling and sharing capabilities to ensure an adequate response to security
threats in the 21st century.
3.1. Merge and share
The idea of pooling and
sharing was announced in December 2008 by the EU Defence
Ministers in the Declaration of Abilities. In April 2010, the Steering Board of
the European Defence Agency, in the format of defence ministers, adopted the general framework objective
of the merger and sharing initiative and endorsed the roadmap for its
implementation[3].
On 9 December 2010, the
Council adopted conclusions on the development of military capabilities in
which member states are encouraged to systematically conduct analysis of their
national military capabilities and structures with a view to identifying those
capable of being co-developed through the approach of merge and share.
On 3 February 2011, a seminar
was held in Budapest (rotating president of the EU Council at that time in
Hungary), where a common understanding of the concept of pooling and sharing
capabilities was achieved. The effectiveness of the initiative to preserve and
develop military capabilities in a European format and the need for political
will to implement it was confirmed.
The concept of capability
sharing and cost-sharing provides an opportunity for existing capabilities to
become more cost-effective and operationally efficient.
According to the European Defence Agency, the merger and sharing approach can be
dual-use, both military and civilian in the field of technology.
In recent years, three
important highlights have stressed the need for the reassessment of the concept
of unification and sharing.
Firstly, the Lisbon treaty
introducing the so-called “Permanent structured cooperation”. Permanent structured defence co-operation does not duplicate NATO activities of
member states that are both in the two allies; rather it is a concept for
countries that want closer cooperation and ability to act in the field of
military activities. Its main objective was to enhance the EU's operational
potential through cooperation and interaction between member states. At this stage, the governments of the
countries do not have a clear vision of permanent structured defence co-operation, having two options: either to merge
existing military projects or to initiate new ones. In this regard, the SCP is
currently being considered as the only instrument allowing for closer
cooperation between member states expressing their willingness to become part
of the permanent process without being hindered by those who may hold opposing
views, while at the same time achieving goals that could not be implemented by
individual countries.
Simultaneously, the European Defence Agency,
on its part, should continue its work on the merger initiative by realising:
- a level-based, high-level discussion to specify the
state’s intentions, pooling and sharing opportunities;
- carrying
out analyses to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the projects and
programs being developed, the exchange of experience and information on
possible future consolidation;
- identify
legal, technical and financial instruments that need to be developed to support
the implementation of projects and programs under the merger and sharing
initiative.
Secondly, the adoption of the
so-called “Defence Package” of the
European Commission (EC), containing measures that are binding on member
states, which mainly includes two directives:
- Directives
2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 aimed at
simplifying the export controls on defence-related
products within the EU;
- Directive
2009/81/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of certain works, supply and service
contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security[4].
The adoption of both
directives (2009/43/EC and 2009/81/EC) aims to simplify procedures for the
movement of military goods between member states and to increase and establish
more opportunities for defence procurement and
competition in the EU.
Thirdly, the adoption of the
Ghent Framework in December 2010, which was expected to be a sustainable
strategic framework for systematic exchange of defence
planning information in the member states, as a basis for consultation and
coordination from the bottom up, on a voluntary basis[5].
The Ghent Framework provided a
political platform for member states to benefit from the basic legal
instruments at their disposal - 'permanent structured cooperation' and two
Directives - 43/81. The Gent framework
engages the debate on defence budgets in Europe, emphasising that the only way to reduce them is through
“intelligent” (using the NATO vocabulary) forms of cooperation and
avoiding circumstances dictated by circumstances that do not resolve existing
strategic deficits.
The Framework aims to identify
and assess the military capabilities of the member states in three categories:
- capabilities to be maintained at the national level, with
enhanced compatibility and operational capability.
- ability to “pool”;
- capabilities that may serve as both role sharing and
targeted “sharing”[6].
Against this background,
European NATO member states and CSDP builders should
define their potential, in view of the fact that it should be permanent and
structured rather than incidental and vaguely defined. This is the reason the
Ghent Framework should create a platform for new initiatives to build joint
capabilities.
The Ghent framework is based
on three political conditions:
- avoids sensitive policy issues - such as the creation of
command and control structures, a European military base;
- acts
in accordance with the transatlantic agenda, this implies pursuing the European
road to “intelligent” defence, “3D”
rule in EU-NATO relations - not to duplicate, divide, discriminate[7];
- keeps
public expectations low, that is, avoiding the automatic adoption of the
“uniting and sharing” initiative with the creation of a European
army.
The Gent Framework outlines
four principles that contribute to productive cooperation:
- transparency of projects and their risks;
- strategic approach to capabilities and complementarity in
the light of NATO agenda;
- harmonisation of technical
collateral;
- depolitisation of the
decision-making process.
To date, we can say that the
EU member states are still pursuing their defence
planning with a high degree of isolation. The top-down approach is a necessity
for achieving visible results, not in the sense of Brussels imposing decisions
on the member states, but in the sense of the responsibility and commitment of
the defence ministers for greater convergence of
forces, so that the overall goals of security and capabilities are met.
3.2. Intelligent defence
The essence of intelligent defence is to provide greater security than the Allies did,
working together with less money at higher levels of flexibility[8].
The intelligent defence concept supports development and capability
development projects, especially from the areas identified in the defence planning process as key. This group includes both
accepted projects before and after the formulation of the initiative,
reflecting the principles set out in it.
The initial package of
multinational projects is the so-called Group 1 project and is characterised by the presence of a leading
nation, confirmed participating countries and a range of projects adopted by
these countries:
- NATO Anti-Missile Defence
Project
The NATO Alliance's capability in the broadest sense is
the ability of the Alliance's military structures to make effective use of the
available ODA funds for the exchange and assessment of the situation and to act
to offset limited ballistic threats within a standing watch. In order to
declare availability, two conditions are needed: first, NATO must have the
necessary military capacity and capabilities, and second, the necessary
political and regulatory platform has to be developed. The military assets to cover NATO's covert task and protect Europe's
population, territory and sites from ballistic missiles are a radar sensor, an
Eagles anti-missile system located on a ship and patrolling in the
Mediterranean Sea and NATO's command and management system. The announcement of NATO's
capability is a step in the primary responsibility of the state and political leadership of the states towards their peoples,
namely, to cover and protect the population and territory of the member states, with a viable allied armed
force and technique, through mechanisms of collective protection and
cooperation with partners. This ability evolved over the years by refining the used interceptors of
the PRO and expanding their number on the territory of Europe - in Romania
(2015) and Poland (2018).
- Joint Intelligence and Monitoring (JISR) / Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) project
This initiative aims to compensate and eliminate the
missing critical capabilities regarding the exchange of information and the
availability of qualified personnel for Joint Intelligence and Surveillance.
Its implementation takes place in three main directions: building a network
environment for the exchange of intelligence information including the AGS main
operational base, a review of existing NATO-wide procedures for the exchange of
information and the degree of interoperability between the parties, training
and staff training.
- NATO's project for the approach to airspace
protection
Balancing air defence
achievements and special treaties with Albania, Luxembourg and Slovenia provide
an example of intelligent defence.
The implementation of these
projects aims to build a long-term, coherent and joint intelligent defence
approach that includes:
- avoiding
a subsequent reduction in defence capabilities by
filling existing deficits and investing in new capabilities in order to avoid
subsequent discrepancies;
- collective prioritisation;
- complementing
the process of planning NATO-led national and defence-related
policies and budgets through broad Allied consultations;
- promoting
synergies between Alliance's intelligent defence
projects and EU pooling and sharing initiatives to ensure their coordination
and complementarity;
- promoting
cooperation in the fields of research, development, public procurement;
- encourage
more active use of joint NATO funding for joint projects by offering ways of
guaranteed access to shared resources;
- involving
Alliance partners in support of NATO-led operations and building a successful
model for strategic air capabilities[9].
Intelligent defence initiatives provide for the preservation of existing
military capabilities, and continued acquisition of new capabilities, with the
goal of effectively prioritising NATO's national
interests. This concept implies national solutions and consensus to harmonise defence actions and
costs, team and supply specialisation.
NATO alliances have long
experience in co-building military capabilities and in optimising
military budgets, such as the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the Strategic Airlift, the AWACS based on common
investments in military infrastructure and in shared capabilities.
In addition to pragmatism and
the “cost-effectiveness” analysis of intelligent defence enforcement, it is related to the introduction of a
new culture of cooperation and a change in NATO and Allies' approach to
capacity development and maintenance of existing ones, through new strategic
thinking and long-commitment. For it to be workable and sustainable in time, it
should be based on trust among the Allies, exchange of information, the
complementarity of resources, and unified coordination.
Presently, the concept is realised through consultations with NATO and the Allies to
coordinate the negotiation and implementation of multinational projects. Thus,
the approach is understood and perceived positively, however, in practice,
still, intelligent defence is seen only as a possible
option, and not as an obligation of the member states.
Given the sensitive nature of
conceptual components, the specialisation section
explicitly clarifies the right of states to make sovereign defence
decisions.
3.3. Challenges
to the reconciliation of the two initiatives
In this regard, considering
the two EU capabilities, cost-sharing initiatives and NATO intelligent defence, they create prerequisites for optimising
the available resources and capabilities and exchanging experience that the
smaller member states of the two unions could not accumulate on their own.
Thus, through specialising and training of their
armed forces value is added to the overall defence
potential.
Therefore, NATO Strategic
Concept also notes that one of the key elements of the EU-NATO Strategic
Partnership is the development and interoperability of the capabilities of the
member states.
The objective picture of NATO
capabilities shows that at present:
- the budgets of most of the allies are limited - 18 spent
less in 2011 than in 2008 with 15 of them European;
- there is cessation, delay or delays in major equipment
projects, and a number of abilities are abandoned;
- there is a limitation on
training in some countries;
- personnel redundancies
are observed in many countries;
- only three Allies spent 2% or more of their defence GDP in 2011. Seventeen spent 1.5% or less in 2011;
- the United States provided 77% of the Alliance spending,
compared to 2001, which was 63%[10].
At the same time, the EU has
no permanent army. Instead, in the framework of its Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), it relies on constituted contingencies
for specific cases by member states for:
- joint disarmament
operations;
- humanitarian and evacuation
missions;
- military advice and
assistance missions;
- conflict prevention and
peacekeeping missions;
- military crisis management missions, including peacekeeping
missions and post-conflict stabilisation operations.
In this respect, the prerequisite
for the success of the two concepts is the need for political will and trust
between member states, as well as the tendency to modernise
their defence capabilities to give impetus to the
three main areas of interaction:
- broadening of political consultations;
- practical cooperation in
operations;
- developing capabilities, avoiding duplication, optimising and sharing costs.
In this context, the
challenges of combining the two initiatives are:
- the initiatives are conceptually of the same approach, but
for two different organisations. The EU and NATO are
different in terms of membership, nature, objectives, structures, activities
and history. Sceptics claim that a direct political agenda between them is
difficult, as there is no formal institutional link, and this in practice means
28 NATO countries impose their will on Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland,
Cyprus and Malta or the other 28 EU member states impose their will on the USA,
Canada, Turkey, Norway, Iceland and Albania[11];
- the
United States is a member of NATO, which allocates significant financial
resources to defence and develop new technologies and
capabilities, as opposed to part of the EU
member states of the Union;
- the major obstacle faced by NATO-CSDP
relations is the political contradictions between Turkey and Cyprus. In this
regard, despite the official interactions between the CSDP
and NATO, nothing guarantees the EU that Turkey will cooperate with the CSDP in situations where it would feel a threat to its own
interests in the field of security. In fact, as can be seen in the Balkans,
Afghanistan and Libya, the CSDP and NATO act
together, but that is only because of their common goals. Because Turkey itself
is still in the process of defining its strategic objectives in the current situation,
it prefers to follow its line in the CSDP-NATO
relations.
In this context, there is
still a predominant view that the relationship between the two organisations is unsatisfactory and not sufficiently
functional. Furthermore, they should be involved together in operations, avoid
competition and rivalry, achieve synergy and a high
level of coherence among themselves.
The three key steps in this
direction should be:
- common perception of threats and common priorities;
- pooling and sharing capabilities;
- better coordination of efforts
for both member states and the two NATO-EU organisations,
respectively.
4. CONCLUSION
In view of the key documents- the EU Lisbon Treaty and
the 2010 Strategic Concept of NATO, it is clear that they provide a good basis
and an opportunity for closer cooperation between the two allies. Although
currently there are mechanisms of interaction between the EU and NATO and
despite the declared willingness to cooperate, they act rather independently of
each other (not in competition), forming a strategic vision within each organisation and not in the general context. Interaction
and complementarity is formally documented and has a declarative character, but
virtually no harmonisation of capabilities is
observed. There is need for a better-coordinated and timely response to crises
and conflicts, an overall assessment of risks and threats, and a complementary
approach in the process of overcoming and specialising
and profiling the two allies according to their strengths.
There are a number of reasons for this:
-
tensions between Cyprus and Turkey;
-
interests of the military industry in certain
member states;
-
desire of some countries for a European army
and a greater EU autonomy in the field of security and defence;
-
follow-up by the European Commission on its
own agenda;
-
different
views of the Alliance's own representatives on the idea of an autonomous EU defence.
These symptoms, on the one hand, are
perceived by international actors on the international stage and allow for an
individual approach and bilateral interactions between member states and third
countries that do not always correspond to a common strategic Euro-Atlantic
vision.
On the other hand, it is the occasion for the
member states to demonstrate a different approach in both formats. This shows
the key role that national states have in both organisations
and which should be considered when assessing EU-NATO cooperation. These, in
turn, lead to the identification of certain shortcomings.
Firstly, the absolute weight of each state in
NATO and the EU in the decision-making process on security and defence issues. Given the high sensitivity of the public
and the states in this area, due cognizance of the importance of dual
democratic control in the sector should be noted. On the part of civil society,
whose attitudes and media coverage affect decision-makers and, on the other
hand, parliaments that play a key role in the process of adopting defence budgets, as well as control of the sector.
National states, regardless of their size,
degree of economic development and resource security, have the right to block
the processes within and between themselves. The tension between Cyprus and
Turkey and the blocking of Berlin in practice is a typical example.
Secondly, the idea of building a system of
mutual interchangeability of forces is difficult to achieve at this time
because of differences in policies and the level of ambitions and abilities of
the two organisations, respectively. NATO and the EU
are inherently alliances, and at the same time close to each other, in view of
the member states that belong to them and the values they profess. They
represent the backbone of Europe, guaranteeing the stability, development,
peace and security of citizens and states of the old continent. However, this
is simultaneously happening, each fulfilling every one of its agendas and using
a different toolbox, respectively. In view of the current reality, the emphasis
should be shifted from mutual interchangeability to complementarity of forces.
Thirdly, the focus of the two union's
cooperation on energy security and the vulnerability of its critical
infrastructure, as well as the so- global goods - sea, air, space and cyber,
which are of strategic importance to the EU and NATO both militarily and economically.
Unless close synergy and complementarity is achieved based on cooperation,
policy and preparedness, the need for these key resources will lead to
competition, difficult governance, the vulnerability of EU and NATO member
states, and new complex conflicts by state and non-state actors.
Consequently, in view of the new security
architecture, the complex, hybrid nature of threats and risks, there is a need
to deepen the EU-NATO relationship in the area of security, to ensure world
peace.
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Received 29.08.2019; accepted in revised form 10.10.2019
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