Article citation information:
Szczukowski, M. Safety in transportation: a
review of the concept, its context, safety preservation and improvement
effectiveness. Scientific Journal of Silesian
University of Technology. Series Transport. 2017, 95, 197-212. ISSN: 0209-3324.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2017.95.18.
Maciej SZCZUKOWSKI[1]
SAFETY IN TRANSPORTATION: A
REVIEW OF THE CONCEPT,
ITS CONTEXT, SAFETY PRESERVATION AND IMPROVEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
Summary. The article presents definitions of
and approaches to the concept of safety in order to confirm the subjective
character of its determination, description, and interpretation. By presenting
examples of security statistics and safety-related behaviours, its ambiguity
and complexity are revealed. The author draws attention to the media’s attitude
towards safety-related incidents. With reference to contemporary scientific
knowledge about the methods of improving safety in transportation
organizations, the author also suggests that safety improvement initiatives
should focus more strongly on facilitating closer cooperation between leaders,
superiors and subordinates with different levels of experience.
Keywords:
safety; security; transport; aviation; psychology; media
1.
Introduction
Every
contemporary discipline in life is associated with the concept of safety (or
security)[2]. It has become a natural
and integral part of any discussion, analysis and criticism of projects and
development initiatives. A Google search under “level+of+safety” returns almost
24 million responses. When determining the level of safety or its change, we
claim that our understanding of the essence of the concept is universal. As a
result, we are minded to view its adjectival, qualitative or even quantitative
interpretations in a common way. However, the analysis of scientific and
professional literature, along with media reports and public opinion, reveals
that safety perception and awareness are affected by a significant amount of
seemingly unrelated factors.
The
following article aims to show safety from different perspectives, through the
prism of the conditions and methods of its establishment, regulation and
assessment. The intent here is to indicate how subjectivity, within the
interpretation of the term, may become an inhibiting factor in its preservation
and development. It also explains how people who are believed to be directly
responsible for the level of safety, due to a distorted and unclear information
flow, can be forced into taking defensive positions and, in turn, obliged to
present excessive, and sometimes useless, albeit socially expected, caution.
2. definiNG
safety and security
According
to the Polish definition, from the Glossary
of National Security Terms, security is “a condition which gives a sense of
certainty and guarantees its preservation as well as the chance to improve” and
“the situation distinguished by a lack of risk of losing something that one
particularly appreciates” [2]. Authors of this particular definition divide the
concept into subunits focusing on the following components of life: economic,
social, psychological, military etc.
Analysing
the definitions of security in English and German reveals an interesting fact.
The Cambridge Dictionary defines
security thus: “protection of a person, building, organization or country
against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries” [12]. At the
same time, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary
explains security as: “the quality or state of being secure; [...] freedom from
fear or anxiety”
[42]. The
definition in German, based on the works of Kuhlmann and Jungemann, presented
in Dorsch Lexikon der Psychologie, states that security is a “condition without
damage or perception of a state without damage or potential damage” (“Zustand ohne Schädigung oder Wahrnehmung
eines Zustands ohne Schädigung oder potenzieller Schädigung”) [17, 28, 34]. A
disparity between all three definitions is clearly visible. The Polish
interpretation of the concept concentrates on sense and a guarantee, but is
also open to improvement. The English explanation focuses on a lack of fear and
anxiety (psychological states) and refers to the threat of foreign state
attack. Finally, the German interpretation relates the theory to a state or
sense of damage. Thus, all definitions try to establish the
essence, the source and the direction of possible threats. They also suggest
that achieving complete and absolute security is impossible because the notion
itself is relative, which means that it is always the result of a subjective evaluation.
Maurice et al., in their definition, describe safety as control over the
occurrence of risks, hazards or conditions, which are conducive to human health
and the loss of well-being [41]. They add that, to achieve a high level of
security, it is necessary to recognize the actual existence of adequate
protection against danger (“sheltered from danger”). In order to achieve this,
among the four basic, necessary preconditions, the authors refer to respect for
the individual, along with her or his psychological integrity.
All of
the definitions presented above prove the internal, psychological source of
safety or security perception. The German description especially links the
notion with the most unpleasant perspective of damage, thus placing itself
closest to the most-known concept with Maslow’s hierarchical order of needs. At
the same time, definitions of security, through a process of clarification
about their essence, indicate the dependence on external factors. For example,
a condition of economic security is an “opposition to external pressures” [2].
However, according to Stankiewicz, such a goal constitutes only a limited range
of impact, whereas global security, as its name suggests, concerns “all
mankind” [59]. This points to the fact that creating a definition of security
is a burdensome task involving a significant degree of discretion and
subjectivity. For example, the definition of energy security recognizes the
need for the “economic justification” of the demand for energy, which is
required by virtually every sector in the economy [63]. Bojarski, meanwhile,
reminds us that the statement of economic rationale may indicate protection of
the interests of suppliers, not society, by ensuring adequate financial rates
and eliminating the risks associated with competitiveness [9]. This, however,
creates room for the formation of pressure from companies and, in turn, affects
local politics and subsequent media coverage, which reaches society.
3.
Transport safety data presentation
To
conduct an analysis of the concept of safety in transportation, one should
first consider the meaning of the two, usually exchangeable, notions: “safety”
and “security”. According to The New
Penguin English Dictionary, safety is defined as “the condition of being
safe from causing or suffering harm or loss” [61]. Security, however, is
described as “freedom from danger, fear, anxiety, destitution, etc.” [61].
Fellner, by pointing to the need for the highest standards of safety in the
operation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), quotes Sładkowski, who defines
security in relation to aviation security (in terms of preventing of acts of
unlawful interference) [19, 54]. The other idea (safety) is set on the basis of
work by Sładkowski, who describes it with regard to “environmental and
technical parameters, regulations [...], causing the level of risk of injury,
of a fault or an error occurrence to be lower than the maximum level approved
by the competent authority” [55].
The
above-listed definitions indicate how imprecise or unrealistic the concept of
safety or security is, both from the point of view of psychology and of society
as a whole, given its specific expectations. First, the definitions allow for
the existence of a risk of error or detriment. Second, they recognize the right
to determine the level of acceptance of risk or detriment. In addition, they
determine the perception of safety/security as subjective, by the existence of
“feeling” and, in parallel, by striving to reach an unreal state of the
disappearance of any anxiety (although a substantial or complete deficit of
fear, at least at a moral level, may be considered one of the psychopathic
personality traits). At the same time, they claim protection against a loss,
although failure or defeat remains in line with the natural structure of life,
or even particular preferences among human beings (e.g., in business, sports or
gambling), which in turn results in conflict with our own choices.
The
subject of security, as mentioned in Chapter 2, clearly exposes itself here.
According to the definition by Sładkowski, aviation security refers to
measures, which have an impact on the whole (state) or on a limited, specific
social group (e.g., in the case of terrorist attacks, by a specific range; or,
in the case of a tragic outcome, by the number of victims). The definition by
Sładkowski also concerns organizations or social groups (airline, airline
pilots, air navigation service provider, air traffic controllers, passengers
etc.). On a smaller scale, it relates to individuals (a general aviation pilot,
a car driver etc.). These definitions do not recognize the temporal variation
in the level of security threats, but rather depend on local or global events.
As Stach and Maliszewski mentioned, among the security threats to the state at
the main airport in Warsaw are “low-lying fogs (visibility of less than 600 m)”
and the possibility of changes in the role of border guards, who are engaged in
protecting the state border, given the commercialization of the Polish Airports
State Enterprise [56]. Six years after the publication of these authors’ work,
the former threat has been reduced by investment in airport infrastructure
(low-visibility procedures), whereas the latter has become out-of-date in light
of certain business and political decisions, as well as the influence of
current European law. This proves a continuous variation in the meaning and
importance of the factors that determine the subjectivity behind establishing
the level of security.
Chronology
and a reference to the past or previous forecasts represent a strong argument
in the discussion about the level of safety, especially when such information
is set together with locations, courses of events, backgrounds and effects of
specific incidents. For example, the information that the number of road
accidents in 2015 was 5.7% lower than in 2014 is objectively optimistic [32].
However, further analysis of the statistics reveals that, in the Lubusz
Voivodeship (Western Poland), the number of fatal accidents increased by more than
13%. It was also determined that one of the months with the greatest number of
accidents was December. While it may be considered that this is due to a
particular aura in the winter months, the authors draw attention to two
different factors: the early time of dusk and the worsened visibility of
pedestrians on the roads. The same analysis also shows that the incomparably
greater number of accidents took place under good weather conditions, even when
compared to conditions of strong wind or fog. Meanwhile, another analysis
indicated that a straight section of the road is the most common site of
accidents; this factor accounted for almost 87% of events in 2012 [20].
Although general statistics and research studies claim that the level of safety
on the roads is subject to continuous improvement, a deeper analysis and
comparison of data, which are typically not compared or even ignored, diminish
the positivity of the picture on initial viewing. One example of such a
misleading image, although the overall coefficients are positive, is that the
average number of accidents per 10,000 people, in the period from January 2010
to October 2013, in the Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship (north-western part of
Central Poland) was 0.52, whereas, in the city of Lodz (also Central Poland)
alone, it was 1.32 (or 254% more) [66].
Referring to
the field of aviation and its development by forecasts, STATFOR (Eurocontrol’s
Statistics and Forecast Service) predicts that air traffic will grow by 2.2%
(on average) in the period between 2015 and 2022 [48]. It is worth remembering
that, despite the economic crisis in 2009, the cost-efficiency of air traffic
management/communications, navigation and surveillance services within the
European region showed a decrease in costs by almost 10%. From the point of
view of estimated indexes and social expectations, such information is
objectively positive. The authors suggest, however, that, to date, acceptable
levels of safety performance were neither defined nor established. According to
the ICAO definition, acceptable levels of safety performed are defined
according to “the minimum level of safety performance of civil aviation in a
State, as described in its State safety programme, or of a service provider, as
defined in its safety management system, expressed in terms of safety
performance targets and safety performance indicators” [27]. This minimum, and
therefore acceptable, level of safety is calculated as the probability of an
aircraft accident, separately for each company providing the services within
the field. Moreover, the definition of security, in the context of aviation,
states that the possibility of harm “is reduced to, and maintained at or below,
an acceptable level”. It should be achieved by “a continuing process of hazard
identification and safety risk management” [27]. In comparison to the
definitions presented in Chapter 2, such wording recognizes the perseverance of
the safety protection process. Interestingly, the ICAO acknowledges here the
significance of internal (domestic) and external (international) normative
influences, as well as the importance of accepting various cultural factors [27].
The
fundamental analysis of the data, as well as the assumptions presented above,
shows how complicated the concept of safety is. While the simple message, in
the form of usually favourable statistics, provides the feeling of an adequate
level of protection, the realistic approach to achieving the expected outcomes
must be the result of systemic, objective and even interdisciplinary attitudes
towards the challenge. Otherwise, success in such missions, as presented by a
particular group, can in fact, and within a different framework, localization
or time span, remain a state of unacceptable risk for another party.
4. Safety
as a derivative
It is
still often recognized that security is the result of activities by a human
being or group of people, or end users (drivers, pilots, whole crews, air
traffic controller, a team of controllers, etc.). Such an approach, however,
results in the conscious rejection of other components of a complex chain of
dependencies. Moreover, it diminishes the importance of factors, which are
beyond the control of human will, opinion or decision. Bak and Bak-Gajda
highlighted such a limitation, stating that, “in the system of road safety, the
human being is the decisive element. He or she is, on one hand, the co-creator
of the road traffic, and, on the other, a user of the road” [8].
Sadłowska-Wrzesińska pointed out, by using any workplace as an example, that,
apart from the lack of proper knowledge or a wrong approach to the execution of
one’s work, the driving force behind work-related errors are inadequate working
conditions [53]. The author did not necessarily refer to technical or social
conditions, but indicated the importance of the social component and the need
to “promote good practices in a broad sense of safety culture”.
The
sense of security, and therefore the perception of the level of threat
possibility, results not only from objective reality, but also from individual
personality traits [50]. The level of anxiety or even fear is the result of the
structure of personality, current psychological conditions, and one’s
experiences (subjectively perceived risk, frequency of hazardous events,
quality of rewards and severity of punishments, legal systems and level of
criminalization etc.). In effect, one’s behaviour does not result only from a
simple choice between known options, but from the context in which one has to
make this choice. At the same time, and according to behaviouristic psychology,
only observed behaviours constitute reliable data. Thus, in principle, during
an analysis of incidents or accidents, it is not possible to consider previous
alternative intentions as arguments. Hence, a rich source of knowledge about
the overall decision-making process is rejected, while analysts lose the
ability to identify and study many elements of the “puzzle”. Beyond psychology,
a similar distortion occurs with incidents’ media coverage, which strongly
affects the public perception of the level of security (by usually presenting
only the most negative components of the occurrence) and decreases the level of
trust towards the entities that, as a result of media coverage, are being
assessed.
Almost
20 years ago, Mackay stated, in an article, that contemporary air traffic
control could be perceived as “extremely safe and efficient” [39]. This article
covered the issue of flight strips, which are tools that have bene used by most
controllers for decades and throughout the world. The author noticed that
altering the amount of computer support in a flight strip computing process
will most likely not account for the numerous safety elements involved, which
may result in fatal accidents. On the other hand, strip augmentation, as
suggested in the same work, has been a factor for many years. Experiences from
the past have confirmed that such negative safety expectations were no more
wrong than any other major revision of standard operating procedures in air
traffic control. Over time, a new and previously unknown human factor entered
into the equation, resulting from the challenges posed by human-machine
interaction. Thus, the definition of flight strip use safety had to be changed
and a different perspective needed to be taken to convince the public that
safety levels were still being kept at an adequate level.
In the
aviation field, where air traffic flow is largely a result of the continuous
exchange of data, communication is the critical element in safety. One of the
most tragic aviation disasters in history (at Los Rodeos Airport, Tenerife, in
March 1977) is an example of an event in which the quality of communication has
been recognized as a causal factor. A more thorough analysis of this particular
event, through the prism of knowledge about cooperation styles in cockpits and
general relationships between crew members almost four decades ago, indicates
that the mental state of the captain, not the communication content, was the
main factor that led to the lack of unequivocal opposition among the rest of
the crew and, in turn, the tragedy [13]. Fischer and
Orasanu stated that up to eight different methods of communicating a need can
be distinguished. Among them, only one bears the hallmark of an instruction
(e.g., “Stop now!”). The rest represent suggestions or hints to varying degrees
of severity and possible or expected responses (e.g., “Shouldn’t we stop now?”)
[21]. This interesting discovery points to the fact that not every
communication carries a message, which, despite the sender’s best intentions,
will be adequately understood by the recipient. In the event of a significant
difference in the status of individual team members, the message may be further
distorted up to a state in which it becomes completely useless, even though the
original content remains critical to the safety state. Alongside well-studied
effects of cognitive or expectation bias, other scientific findings have shown
that pilots tend to seek continuous reassurance about their original
judgements, such that, due to such high demands resulting in a “think fast”
attitude, communication gradually loses its absolute value [4]. In
communication between pilots and air traffic controllers, this problem can even
lead to the unintentional rejection of critical information, arising from
ambiguity or limited suggestibility (as well as due to the physical distance
between sender and receiver). Phrases such as “We have a limited amount of
fuel”, “We’re running out of fuel” and “We have fuel for 10 minutes of flight
time” are examples of such a communication trap (cf. the Avianca plane crash in
1990). The problem concerning the lucidity of relationships between
pilots was discussed during the Go-Around Safety Forum conference, which took
place in Brussels in 2013, where it was entirely justified that there exists a
need to establish a clear and categorical method to inform other members of the
cockpit crew about one’s decision to interrupt an approach to landing (in the
case of an unstabilized approach). It was further recognized that one of the
challenges is to secure the right of less experienced pilots to communicate
their opinions and decisions, even considering the possible objection to an
experienced commander of the aircraft. In the domain of air traffic control, a
similar situation concerns a potential conflict between employees of different
seniorities, experiences or even obtained ratings.
Apart
from episodic issues, Nevile and Walker highlighted the problem of a possible
gradual build-up of interaction problems [45]. According to Dekker, and based
on research among pilots, both the environment around them and their location
within the environment continuously
recreate communication standards [16]. To identify adverse changes, recordings
of communication, which are typically carried out using the aircraft’s on-board
equipment (or recording equipment in air traffic control centres), should be
analysed, not only in respect of their verbal content. When trying to
understand reasons for a possible human decision or error, in cases of accident
analysis, experts should make an attempt to determine participants’ moods and
emotions, both before and during an act of decision development or execution,
as well as throughout the duration of the flight or duty. Well established qualitative
methods, for example, discourse analysis [31, 64] or thematic analysis [11],
grant access to detailed data, but also allow for actors’ perceptions and
perspectives to be considered, including on a purely emotional level. On the
other hand, it should be noted that, despite the tempting idea that emotions
may condition decision-making, the results of scientific research are
inconclusive. In chronological order, Green has found a relationship between
accidents and pilots’ personalities [24], while Lester and Bombaci, Lester and
Connolly, and Platenius and Wilde, when studying impulsiveness, have been
unable to confirm any significant correlations [36, 37, 49]. According to
Hunter, an effect size of only 4% of variance was calculated between dangerous
or fatal occurrences and risk tolerance [26]. Further, Fischoff et al. stated
that overconfident people evaluate the level of risk wrongly for up to 30% of
the time [22]. In the case of an incident or accident, such overconfidence can
be directly attributed as a personality-related causation. Meanwhile, research
by Copper shows that risk-taking does not necessarily have to be a personality
component, as it can also be a derivative of the need for achievement [14],
which is so rarely taken into account during incident or accident analysis.
For
over two decades, there has been a change in perspective, shifting from
individual responsibility to an organizational safety climate. The original
responsibility of the individual has been divided into values and elements on
which a person may have only a limited influence: namely, management values and
concern, quality of equipment and training, and conditions for employees’
involvement in safety culture [44]. It has been found that environmental
influence exceeds individual traits. Therefore, a responsible approach to
safety analysis requires additional efforts in order to match personal choices
with organizational, legal and psychological needs.
5. Safety
and the media
Apart
from the fact that any individual, when making a decision, must take into
account a particular context, safety-related domains are carefully observed by
contemporary media and the wider public. For them, context mainly concerns the
social effect of the decision (in the case of any tragic event, this usually
means the number of victims or the range of losses). The media, however, are
aware that the present approach to information requires the provision of short,
compressed and expressive content, which, in general, consciously resists
alternative interpretations or additional opinions.
No
single decision carries a fixed effect. Although many everyday decisions are
based on experience, and thus reinforced by expected outcomes, the variable
context (environment, standards, culture, penalization, experiences of others,
expectations etc.) can actively determine the interpretation and evaluation of
the decision. Examples of two different police officers’ decisions reveal the
weight of appraisal, despite the obvious complexity of the context. In June 2016,
a police officer from Czestochowa helped the parents of a suffocating toddler
by instructing them on the telephone about how to conduct resuscitation [47].
Social reactions (Internet comments) were mostly positive, praising the
abilities and attitude of the officer. However, one could also find critical,
negative opinions about inaccuracy of the police officer’s instructions, while
pointing out that the positive outcome was only a coincidence. To compare,
another article described police officers’ intervention against an aggressive
32-year-old man with diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia. After being subdued, the
man began to suffocate, with bystanders asking the police officers to provide
help. In the end, the suspect died as a result of not having been rescued by
the police officers or anyone else [67]. The Internet comments were all
negative, including invectives and threats directed at the police officers.
Here, one should note that the latter article was much longer than the former
one and included the victim’s life story, as well as comparison with four other
cases. All of these cases, however, happened in the US and concerned two events
where police officers had shot drivers who had failed to stop for a roadside
check, as well as the infamous case when a police officer killed the black
teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson in 2014.
In
general, it is now widely believed that one of the functions of contemporary
media is to tell people how to make choices and what to think [33]. In the
pursuit of better audience ratings, the media use numerous techniques, which
originate from psychology, sociology or marketing. Provocation is one of their
techniques. Driessens defines this as “a mediated act that questions norms,
values, rules, laws and symbolic power in such a way that it intentionally runs
counter to the ‘normal’ horizon of expectations in a given situation or
context” [18]. According to Kowalik, and based on the political type of
provocation, the aim is to create an alternative reality in which to attack an opponent
and ridicule her or him. A common reaction to the first reports (and hence a
reality created by the media) about the Germanwings 9525 crash, containing
information content that the second pilot, Andreas Lubitz, committed suicide
deliberately by using the airplane as a tool, led to the immediate and constant
monitoring of Lubitz’s neighbourhood and numerous interviews with Lubitz’s
neighbours. Knowing that “social acts lose their meanings if considered outside
their social settings”, the media had a rather easy task in combining
neighbours’ statements in a provocative manner [5]. Thus, without any formal
accident analysis (which, in the final reports, revealed a different reality to
the one presented by media), the suspect was almost immediately ridiculed and
lynched. The effects, however, concerned the whole aviation world, forcing
airlines and aviation organizations to constitute rules and offer mitigation in
order to satisfy the expectations of society, whose knowledge was formed by
media provocations, not the facts (see also Chapter 6, Paragraph 2).
After more
than a year, airline representatives began to notice that expectation-induced
mitigations failed to solve the dilemma concerning psychological problems among
airline crew members. Nowadays, the question remains as to what can be done to
prevent adverse occurrences as that involving Germanwings 9525. According to
the article by Adamaszek, the bystanders, who observed the schizophrenic man
suffocating without any help provided by the police officers, were informed by
the officers that their lack of actions was conditioned by the law [67]. It
seems simply unnatural to accept such a statement as the reasoning behind their
professional choice. However, one should consider what could be the overall context
of the situation. Were the officers ever involved in high risk-related training
or interventions? Were such training courses useful or interventions
successful? What were the organizational contexts and standards regarding
police officers’ superiors in terms of policies and methods of interventions
and risk-taking? What were officers’ experiences concerning unsuccessful
attempts to provide premedical help to suspects, etc? Furthermore, the question
remains as to police officers’ experiences concerning the media’s approach to
high-risk interventions, knowing that biased media content may significantly
alter risk perception and, in effect, distort actual legal responsibilities [65].
In the
aviation domain, the parallel between risk perception and risk evaluation is
clearly visible in case of emergency medical kits, which are placed on board
aircraft. Apart from first aid items, they constitute part of the aircraft’s
medical equipment. However, no member of the crew is allowed to use its
contents (drugs, medical instruments etc.); only a medically qualified person
can handle the kit. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau,
between 1975 and 2006, over 15% of all medical events on board aircraft were
heart attacks, which were also the most common reason for aircraft diversions [46].
According to DeHart, statistically, in 85% of cases, there is at least one
medical practitioner on board an aircraft in flight [15]. What is the overall
context regarding this particular problem? While the risk of there being no
licensed doctor or nurse on board is only 15%, at least one in every six cases
of medical emergencies is severe enough to require medical assistance and
diversion. Therefore, in up to five out of six cases, airlines are willing to
place a higher risk on passengers’ safety, while, at the same time, protecting
themselves against the possible risk of an unsuccessful medical intervention by
the respective airline’s employees. In the author’s opinion, there exists a
correlation between such calculations and the “post-Germanwings” mitigations.
Although several experts have already noticed the need for additional medical
training for cabin crew (at least covering cardiopulmonary incidents, involving
the use of modern, light and external defibrillators), the discussion (most
probably media-induced) will only be considered justifiable after the first
tragic event on board an aircraft is considered “attractive” to the “viewer”.
Probably,
any safety-related domain nowadays faces the problem of decision-making, risk
and responsibility. The idea of efficiency, in particular, against
expectations, experiences or even anxieties, requires people to make decisions
in no time at all, even when their risk perception is limited or biased. Thus,
it seems that the tendency is to focus on critical opinions and assessments of
the past, as well as protect oneself, rather than act in the name of general
“utilitarian” safety. The position and abilities of the present-day media
strengthen the belief that expected, rather than objectively correct, actions
should be taken, again to protect oneself. As modern technology allows for
easier information gathering, editing (including manipulation) and publishing
(also by amateurs), the challenge, in the field of safety, is to be able to
oppose the expected “exciting” method of “digestible” and attractive content
presentation, while ensuring the right for thoughtful discussion about
capabilities vs. expectations or underlying assumptions. Even in the case of
tragic events.
6. Safety
as a development tool in an organization
It is
understandable that the degree of confidence about safety will always be kept
at the highest-possible level. This results from the expectations and needs of
society, but also allows for its protection by monitoring and reacting. Any
negative or neutral forecasts announce phases that should involve the analysis
of past occurrences, whereas positive predictions anticipate times in which
such analysis and its resulting reactions are verified. Such a scheme corresponds
to the definition of safety promotion by Zohar and Luria [69]. According to
these authors, this involves a process of environmental modifications
(including political, economic and organizational layers) and safety-related
behaviours. In addition, safety promotion cannot exist by simply pursuing these
goals to a partial extent, as there are constant interactions between them. In
parallel, Neal and Griffin noted a correlation between safety participation and
motivation, with more intense participation in safety initiatives incrementing
the latter [43]. However, they also stated that such a relationship results
from positive feedback, presented as a reward for active participation. The
conclusion of their findings is that conformity for a given safety state only,
as it is rarely rewarded, does not build a culture of safety motivation.
Aviation
market analysis shows that air traffic doubles every 15 years. Indeed, by 2035,
over 33,000 more aircraft will be demanded by the market [35]. Moreover, it is
known that the economy is a key factor in aviation market development.
Therefore, the expenditure on safety development will be correlated with the
development and growth of technical or human resources in the aviation field.
Such growth must, without a doubt, correspond to innovations and modifications
of technology and regulations. A delayed reaction, as in the case of UAVs, can
serious affect the level of safety. Reports about airspace infringements,
near-misses and uncoordinated operations of UAVs, especially in busy controlled
airspace, have drastically lowered the perception of the safety level.
Meanwhile, the process of learning about threats and risks regarding live
traffic has generated much opposition, as well as expectations about fast,
universal and optimal protection of safety. In a similar way, after the
Germanwings accident, the aviation world had to confront the value and
importance of the psychological well-being of airline employees. However, this
particular case has clearly demonstrated the effects of impulsive decisions.
The original requirement for the continuous presence of two persons in the
cockpit, presented less than a week after the accident, was adopted by many
operators in and outside Europe almost immediately, with no specific comments on
the quality of the resolution. Interestingly, Carsten Spohr, the CEO of
Lufthansa, stated that a single accident, however terrible, should not affect
the entire aviation system [1], despite the fact that all of the Lufthansa
Group decided to endorse the cockpit occupancy requirement, for precaution. The
Syndicat National des Pilots de Ligne, the union of Air France pilots,
criticized such a hasty and media-driven resolution, indicating that no
definite actions should be taken without the evaluation of risks, especially in
an operational environment. The discussion and resistance among pilots with
regard to risk-increasing were not presented by media, preferring instead to
protect the social judgement of air travel. In the air traffic control domain, there
was also no discussion was the idea of remote control towers [60]. Although
their economic benefits have confirmed their attractiveness, apart from
assumptions and confident predictions, there is no clear and widely available
record of real-life environment safety analyses. Yet, remote towers have been
added to the SESAR project even though the presentations from 2014 juxtapose
lower costs with “increased threats to society,” “contingency solutions” and a
question of availability of airports in case of emergencies [58].
According
to Reason, supported by Sträter, systems can function in a continuous state
involving safety defects, based on the assumption that, as long as there has
been no incident, the system is perceived as safe [3]. In 1977, Borgida and Nisbett
defined such a state as risk homeostasis [10]. The authors also suggested that
such an equilibrium is a derivative of the balance between safety measures and
unsafe occurrences. Therefore, and in respect of what has been presented above,
the initiatives, which are perceived as insecure (not properly assessed,
showing unknown risks etc.) and driven by expectations about better results,
would likely lead to low safety priority perceptions [69]. In effect, the
homeostasis becomes violated, while new initiatives must be undertaken to
retrieve it.
If
unsafe acts are preconditioned, they can also be predicted and thus prevented.
Rash listed numerous preconditioning influences, among them organizational
impacts [51]. He also divided them into categories: resource management
(including inadequate funding, poor equipment design), regulatory climate
(policies, values and culture-related beliefs) and processes (quality,
pressures and objectives of safety programmes). Such classifications reveal the
critical role of supervisors and superiors at any level (a politician may also
be considered a superior). Hofmann et al., meanwhile, found that the quality of
the relationship with a supervisor predicts the safety behaviours of
subordinates [25]. Such a finding, when juxtaposed with the reversed ICAO
definition of safety culture, shows that the attitudes of superiors and
employees are equally important to the overall level of safety. Moreover, as
accidents are rare events, most likely caused by unintentionally wrong decisions,
their “opportunity” to arise must, at least partially, be an effect of
pre-existing conducive conditions [52]. Therefore, one may suspect that certain
actions in the past could have made the system, in which the accident has
happened, vulnerable to the occurrence. If such vulnerability has not been
identified before, this means that the system has not or could not be
adequately evaluated. If, however, this susceptibility has been previously
diagnosed, but has not been or could not have been reported (hence, it has been
overcome by supervisors or superiors), the safety culture may not be considered
as working, thereby allowing problems and obstacles to accrue over time [43].
Eurocontrol’s performance review report for 2015
revealed an interesting fact about occurrence reporting (including aircraft
separation infringement, unauthorized penetrations of airspace or runway
incursions). Between 2006 and 2015, for all these types of incidents, their
frequencies were presented by a sinusoidal-like line. The authors claimed that
conclusions should not be drawn from the data provided because it is not clear
whether the fluctuations are an effect of actual safety performance or whether
they resulted from variable reporting levels. They also added that the results could
have been an effect of the “inadequate prevention of similar incidents or
inadequate sharing and dissemination of lessons learned” [48]. A question
immediately arises as to whether such an approach is authorized to reassure
society about a continuous process of safety improvement or whether the
characteristic of “seasonal” variations in safety levels is an inherent part of
it and so should be presented. There also remains an issue about the
effectiveness of information sharing and how active and efficacious this is
within local safety initiatives, shared between subordinated and superiors.
The
aviation domain, and probably the entire field of transportation, continuously
conduct discussions into safety improvements. The effects, which, according to general
statistics, exhibit improvements to some degree, expose limitations that
express themselves in negative terms. In the author’s opinion, this calls for
the partial redefinition and re-evaluation of safety standards (risks, threats,
priorities, methods, mechanisms). The active and responsible role of
supervisors and superiors discloses itself as critical, with less burden on
operational personnel (drivers, pilots, air traffic controllers etc.). Leaders
(regardless of the level of authority) must be able to create a vision and
“create conditions for the team to work in, build and maintain the team, coach
and support the team to achieve success” [23]. To achieve this, it is necessary
to go beyond the immediate licensing requirements, basic safety standards and
exclusively positive public relations. This may only be possible by building
strong partnerships and adapting promptly, yet early enough, as well as
considering future expectations and advances in the overall field of
transportation. According to Martinussen and Hunter, the development of a
leadership-induced safety culture shapes positive safety-oriented behaviours
among employees [40], whereas the lack of such a culture leads to
counterproductive attitudes [62]. According to Zhang, Wand, Liu and Song, this
can be achieved within the air traffic control domain by promoting safety
culture activities, protecting air traffic controllers’ psychological health
and investing in new technologies, with a view to creating new safety nets [68].
Stadnicka and Antosz found that, in most companies with a greater part of
Polish capital (42% of aviation and 34% of automotive businesses in the
research), safety problem-reporting was based on oral or email reports, which
suggests that there exists a certain resistance to formal problem analysis and
archiving (in order to “learn from mistakes”) [57]. The interesting fact is
that many improvements, beyond a safety management system’s (SMS’) formal
requirements and expectations, depend on a number of employee reports, preceded
by an optimal motivation system, which is not necessarily based on financial
rewards. Concerning financial costs, a significant correlation was also found
between the cost of employment (along with workload) and the rate of accidents,
which are recognized as related to human error [30].
7.
Conclusions
The
sense of safety is an integral part of human life and a strong determinant
behind concepts and projects in various fields. It accompanies humankind and,
according to Maslow (in 1943), is the most critical need of a human being.
Although not all scientists agree with Maslow nowadays, which indicates that
the contemporary world (technology, culture, shape of society) have changed the
structure of needs, it remains one of the most-known theories.
Human
nature and performance are highly variable and depend on an extreme number of
variables. Therefore, it has been acknowledged that it is not possible to fully
eliminate aviation incidents and that aviation will always be subject to
threats and risk [27]. Given that any transportation system is a dynamic
structure, the process of safety assessment must be continuous. It must always
reach the most primary source of information and opinion, namely, the employee,
who should continually be kept in a state of optimal motivation towards sharing
any thoughts on the actual state of safety and security. In this process, the
crucial cooperation between subordinates and superiors is supported even by
works of David Hume, 18th century Scottish philosopher and economist, known for
his perspective of combining the concepts of empiricism, naturalism and
scepticism. He stated that, in the domain of the economy, there exist limited
resources. To create the best rules for governing these resources, cooperation
is required. To obtain cooperation, trust is necessary; and, although this
effect is hard to achieve in a contemporary, heterogeneous society, as well as
in complex organizations, a safety-driven climate is necessary, not only to
fulfil the legal requirements, but also because it relates strongly to safety
performance, and in turn to the overall organizational climate. Only then will
safety or security stop being an instrument against employees’ interests, but a
source of innovation for all concerned.
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