Article citation information:
Marszałkiewicz, J. Contemporary threats facing air transport. Scientific Journal of Silesian University of
Technology. Series Transport. 2017,
94, 151-161. ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2017.94.14.
Jakub MARSZAŁKIEWICZ[1]
CONTEMPORARY THREATS FACING AIR TRANSPORT
Summary. Transport and logistics are a global enterprise,
which means transportation must be provided to and from every continent around
the world. This article presents the main threats facing international air
transport in the course of necessary flying over dangerous and unstable
countries, which represent almost a half of world’s land surface.
Keywords: air transportation, aviation security, global
logistics
1. INTRODUCTION
Today, aviation is one
of the main kinds of transport, with modern logistics conducted on a global
scale. This means that that transportation must be provided to and from every
continent. Every year, thousands of tons of cargo and millions of passengers
are carried on intercontinental routes, whether by land transport, maritime
transport (mainly cargo) or air transport [16].
At the same time,
about half of the countries in the world are currently unstable, due to major
risks in terms of the outbreak of social unrest or even civil war and the
collapse of a state. Many of these countries are already considered to be
fallen, with crime, corruption and, often, terrorism and piracy prevalent in
their territory [1]. A list of the fragile states in the world can be found on
Fund for Peace website (http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/).
Fig. 1. Comparison of
maps highlighting the world’s most unstable countries
and the main transport
routes, including flight paths [1]
This article takes 178
countries of the world into account. South Sudan is recognized as the most
unstable state (114.5 instability points, in the “Very High Alert” category),
with the most stable state is Finland (17.8 points, the only country in the
world in “Very Sustainable” category). Poland was in 153rd place (39.8 points,
in the “More Stable” category). In the same category was the USA in 158th place
with 35.3 points. These are the findings of the Fragile States Index 2015 [1]. If we compare the map of global
instability with the map of the world’s major transport routes, you can easily
see how many of the latter are located in dangerous areas.
2. THREATS TO CIVIL AVIATION WHEN
FLYING OVER DANGEROUS AREAS
One of the main modes
of transport in the world today is aviation, which is considered as the safest
mean of transport. Its safety depends on many factors, however. One of the
risks to aviation is the possible destruction of aircraft by weapons in the air
or on the ground. This is a very specific situation, which largely depends on
the political situation in the area where the flight is taking place. In fact,
while airlines ought to immediately suspend flights over politically dangerous
regions, economic and political factors mean that, sometimes civil air
connections remain in place in these regions. There have also been cases of
friendly fire or the shooting down of communication aircraft in areas where
there is no armed conflict. Since the beginning of aviation, there have been
many incidents of opening fire on civil aircraft. In this article, we present selected
examples from recent history [2].
On 1 September 1983,
the most tragic event in aviation history associated with the shooting down of
a communication aircraft by a fighter took place. On that day, a Korean Air
Lines (KAL) Boeing 747-230B was performing a scheduled flight from New York to
Seoul with a stopover in Alaska (flight KAL007). The planned flight route was
via the Bethel beacon and the R-20 airway (marked on the maps in red), which
was only 28 km away from the Kamchatka Peninsula in Soviet airspace. However,
for unknown reasons, shortly after take-off, the KAL Boeing airplane began to
veer off course, missing Bethel by more than 20 km and entering an area
comprising Soviet military bases between Kamchatka and Sakhalin. At the same
time, to the east of Kamchatka, an American RC-135 airplane belonging to the US
Air Force was performing a reconnaissance mission to monitor Soviet missile
tests.
Although the RC-135
was about 1,500 km from the KAL Boeing airplane, the Soviets assumed that both
were on a military mission. When flight KAL007 first flew into the airspace
over Kamchatka and left the Sea of Okhotsk, Soviet fighters failed to catch it.
Sometime later, the Korean airplane again crossed the border into the Soviet
Union and travelled in the direction of Sakhalin. This time, flight KAL007 was
intercepted by a pair of Soviet Su-15 fighters, commanded by Major Gennady
Osipovich, whose fighter number was 805. The Russians argued that a warning had
been given in the form of gunfire, but the Korean crew did not see it. In
addition, Osipovich’s Su-15 remained behind the KAL Boeing, rather than next to
it, so it was inevitable that the crew would not see it. This confluence of
events proved to be tragic for flight KAL007.
Firstly, the KAL
Boeing was barely in Soviet airspace. Secondly, Osipovich, whose fighter was
starting to run out of fuel, do not inform the Soviet ground station that he
was aiming fire at civilian aircraft (he did not do so because nobody asked
about it). After receiving the command from the ground, Osipovich fired two
R-98 (NATO code AA-3 Anab) rockets into the Boeing. The first missile, guided
by infrared, missed the target, but the second, guided by radar, hit the
Boeing, causing decompression and destroying three of its four hydraulic
systems. After 12 minutes, the burning Boeing crashed into the sea about 37 km
west of Sakhalin, killing all 269 people on board. At the time of being hit,
the Boeing was already a few kilometres outside of Soviet airspace [3].
The reason why flight
KAL007 veered off its planned flight path is still unknown to this day. The
official investigation ruled out the participation of the aircraft in an
espionage mission, declaring it to have been a mistake caused by the autopilot
settings. That said, both the Russian side and some Western experts continue to
dispute this official version. The tragedy of flight KAL007 had other
consequences: in 1986, the USA, Japan and the Soviet Union established a joint
air traffic control agreement over the North Pacific Ocean, which gave Soviet
inspectors full access to all civil flight plans. The most important change,
however, was the decision by President Reagan to open up a GNSS for full
civilian use; this is now known as GPS [3].
Many transport
aircraft have also been shot down by a ground-based anti-aircraft artillery.
For example, in 1978 and 1979, the terrorist organization, the Zimbabwe
People’s Revolutionary Army, downed two Vickers Viscount aircraft belonging to
Air Rhodesia (flights 825 and 827) using Strieła shoulder missiles fired from a
man-portable air-defence (MANPAD) system. In the first case, some passengers
survived the crash, but were murdered by terrorists on the ground. This took
place within the territory of Rhodesia, which is now Zimbabwe.
On 27 June 1980, a
Douglas DC-9 being to the Aerolinee Itavia airline (flight 870) crashed into
the Tyrrhenian Sea about 40 minutes after take-off from Bologna, Italy.
Apparently, an object was seen approaching the plane just before the crash. All
81 people on board were killed. This case of this incident is still not clear,
but there are indications that it could have been mistakenly shot down by NATO
forces.
On 24 February 1985,
the Dornier 228 Polar 3 survey-and-research airplane, belonging to the Alfred
Wegener Institute, was shot down by guerrillas from the Polisario Front over
Western Sahara. All three crew members were killed. The Polar 3 was on its way
back from Antarctica and took off from Dakar in Senegal in order to reach
Arrecife on the Canary Islands.
On 6 November1987, the
Air Malawi’s Shorts Skyvan, with the registration 7Q-YNB, was shot down during
a domestic flight from Blantyre to Lilongwe near the city of Ulongwe in
Mozambique. Eight passengers and two crew members were killed.
However, the most
well-known case of shooting down a communication aircraft with a ground (or
water) armament is that of Iran Air flight IR655, involving an Airbus
A300B2-203, with the registration EP-IBU, on 3 July 1988 [3, 6]. The flight
took off at 10:17 from Bandar Abbas in Southern Iran, before heading for Dubai.
On board were 16 crew members and 274 passengers. The flight left after a
27-minute delay, reaching an altitude of 4,300 m above the Strait of Hormuz in
the Amber 59 (A 59) international airway, with a width of 35 km, in an almost
straight line from the take-off point to the destination airport. The entire
flight was to last about 30 minutes.
At that time, the
Strait of Hormuz was patrolled by the American cruiser USS Vincennes
(Ticonderoga type cruiser), which was equipped with the AEGIS air defines
system. The ship was commanded by Captain William C. Rogers III. This unit
patrol was part of Operation Earnest Will, which was designed to protect
Kuwaiti oil tankers from attacks from Iraqi or Iranian forces. As we know,
these two countries had, for years, been in state of absolute war. On the
morning on 3 July, the USS Vincennes entered Iranian territorial waters in
order to pursue a number of Iranian boats, which was carried out in accordance
with international maritime law. These units had earlier fired on an American
helicopter in Iranian airspace.
At about 10:47, the
radar of the USS Vincennes detected an approaching object that was mistakenly
identified as an Iranian F-14 Tomcat fighter. The mistake was in part explained
by the fact that the airport, from where the Airbus had departed, was also used
as a base for the F-14, and, as mentioned, the Airbus took off after a delay of
almost half an hour (so it was not in accordance with the filed flight plan).
The Americans maintain that, before opening fire for as much as 11 rounds, they
tried to establish communication with the approaching plane. The ICAO report
states that the Americans tried to contact its crew on seven occasions using
the military frequency and three times on the civilian frequency before
declaring it to be an unidentified aircraft flying at a speed of 350 knots.
The black box recorder
of the A300 confirmed that the Iranian crew took the last three messages, but
admitted that they were directed to the Iranian P-3 Orion maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, which previously operated in the area. A few seconds
before opening fire, the A300 crew conducted an exchange in English with
traffic control in Bandar Abbas. The Americans do not hear this exchange because
they did not have the necessary frequency set on their receivers. The American
cruiser had also great difficulties in contacting Iranian air traffic control,
not only due to the tense situation between Iran and the US, but also due to a
lack of adequate training in this regard. The Americans had in mind the attack
involving a Iraqi Mirage F1 fighter, which, a year earlier, fired an Exocet
missile at the American frigate USS Stark, killing 37 sailors and injuring a
further 21. The Airbus’ ascent was interpreted by the Americans as preparation
for firing a sea-to-air missile. At about 10.54, the commander of USS Vincennes
ordered two SM-2MR missiles to be fired, both of which hit the Airbus, while
flying at an altitude of 4,100 m at a distance of 14 km from the cruiser,
killing everyone on board.
The incident further
worsened US-Iran tensions, with the Soviet Union requesting a UN resolution
condemning US actions in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, on 24 October 1988, the
USS Vincennes returned to the USA, where the crew of the cruiser were greeted
as heroes and received two Armed Forces Expeditionary Medals (including one for
the officer responsible for the coordination of fire). In 1996, the US
government decided to pay compensation to the Government of Iran to the sum of
61.8 million US dollars for the 248 Iranian citizens who lost their lives on
Iran Air flight IR655.
That said, the
Americans refused to pay compensation for the destroyed aircraft (30 million US
dollars). The US government also announced that the payment of compensation for
the victims of the incident was an act of goodwill, not an admission of guilt.
This payment was made following an investigation by the International Court of
Justice, during which Iran accused the US of a deliberate attack. To this day,
this issue remains controversial. For example, in 2003, the International
Association of Strategic Studies, an NGO, decided that placing a ship with an
AEGIS system in the area of an operating communication aircraft was
irresponsible, while the behaviour of the American captain was aggressive.
Ninety of the cases of
the intentional downing of civilian communication aircraft have occurred
against the backdrop of local conflicts. For example, on 21 September 1993, a
Tu-134A airplane, which belonged to the Transair Georgia airline and was flying
from Sochi in Russia to Sukhumi in Georgia, was shot down on landing by
pro-Russian Abkhazian separatists. A shoulder missile was fired from a MANPAD
system from a boat, resulting in the deaths of five crew members and 22
passengers. A day later, Abkhaz separatists downed a Tu-154B airplane,
belonging to Orbi Georgian Airways, on its landing approach. The aircraft
burned on the runway, causing the deaths of 8 out of 12 crew members and 100 of
the 120 passengers.
Another example of
this kind took place on 10 October 1998, when a Boeing 727 belonging to the
Lignes Aeriennes Congolaises was flying from Kindu to Kinshasa in Congo.
Shortly after take-off, the Boeing was hit by a Strieła MANPAD. All passengers
and crew were killed.
A highly dramatic case
occurred on 22 November 2003 involving an Airbus A300B4-203F (OO-DLL), which
belonged to European Air Transport, a company managed by the famous
transportation business DHL. The A300 was flying from Baghdad to Bahrain, with
only three crew members and cargo on board. A few minutes after take-off, at
about 09:03 local time, the Airbus was hit at a height of 2,450 m by a 9K34 Strieła
3 MANPAD missile. The rocket hit the trailing edge of the left wing. The attack
had been carried out by a small group of fedayeens, who were accompanied by a
French journalist; indeed, it is speculated, that her presence (and,
consequently, the likelihood of appearing in the media) provoked the attack.
The explosion of the rocket damaged one of the fuel tanks and caused a fire.
That said, it did not explode because, paradoxically, it was almost full
(vapours are the main cause of the firing and exploding of fuel; but, in this
case, there was not enough space to produce sufficient vapours in an almost
full tank). However, the airplane experienced a leak of hydraulic fluid,
resulting in the loss of hydraulic power in the steering systems. After about 10
minutes, the crew managed to regain some control over the airplane and
mechanically lowered the landing gear. The first landing attempt was
unsuccessful because the airplane was too high. The second attempt was
successful and the Airbus landed. During taxiing after touchdown, the A300 went
off the runway and stopped outside the airport. The evacuation of crew was very
difficult due to the fact that the airplane landed on a minefield. However, all
were rescued.
Fig. 2. The 9K34 Strieła MANPAD rocket
launcher (USA/NATO code SA-7 Grail) [7]
The most famous incident of recent times
is the tragedy involving a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 (9M-MRD, flight MH17)
on 17 July 2014 [4, 5], resulting in the deaths of 283 passengers and 15 crew
members. An examination of the wreckage revealed that the Boeing had been hit
by an anti-aircraft missile. Officially, the guilty party has not been
identified, but it was most likely shot down by Russian separatists using a
9K37 Buk M1 (SA-11 Gadfly), after incorrectly identifying the target as a
Ukrainian military An-26. A piece of evidence to support this claim was a
Twitter post by the separatist leader Igor Strielkov, who praised the alleged
shooting down of another Antonov, before it quickly disappeared from the
platform. This issue requires some comment. True, most of the blame lies with
the separatists, given that there are many indications to suggest that they
shot down the Boeing. However, we should also enquire as to who, allowed the
Boeing to be in the area in the first place? Based on common sense (and
civilized principles), airspace over areas characterized by armed conflicts
should be closed immediately after the start of fighting, regardless of the
type of armaments at a disposal of the warring factions. This space is
controlled by Ukrainian air traffic services. Why was this not done?
The Ukrainian side has explained that
there was no need to stop civilian air traffic in the respective area because
separatists only possessed light anti-aircraft equipment, which is not capable
of hitting high-flying aircraft. This cannot be taken seriously as advanced
missile sets with bigger ranges can be delivered from Russia within a few hours
every day. The problem is that Ukraine is still very dependent on Russia for
gas supplies. Therefore, despite intense fighting, the Ukrainian Government
operations in the eastern regions are still not defined as warfare activities,
but officially as internal stabilization operations. Closing the airspace over
the eastern regions of Ukraine would be an admission to the world that the
government does not have complete control over the situation, and maybe what is
carried out there constitutes real war. That said, this airspace was closed to
civilian air traffic following the Malaysian B777 incident. Even before,
flights in that area had been withdrawn by airlines from the EU and the USA.
3. CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT PROTECTION
AGAINST MISSILES
The means to mislead
enemy missiles have long been known in military aviation. These mainly include
on-board or suspended pods, which emit energy to jamming systems, as well as
rocket flares and chaffs (aluminium strips). They are used to jam homing
infrared systems (flares) and radar systems (aluminium strips) of flying
missiles. The civilian aviation community is also interested in such devices.
Fig.3. Rafael Britening
system: 1) detection of attack, 2) rocket jamming [11]
The idea of arming
civilian means of transport is not new. Throughout history, transport ships
were often armed for defence purposes. Equipping civilian ships with weapons on
a larger scale was only abandoned in the 20th century. The current threat of
instability in many countries of the world, however, will mean a return to this
concept, at least to some extent. Currently, this also applies to aviation.
So far, attempts to
protect communication aircraft operating in troubled areas have mainly involved
ad hoc methods. In the 1980s, Soviet communication aircraft, when landing in
Afghanistan, were escorted by military helicopters, which fired flares
throughout the landing phase. This method also establishes a very steep
approach path for the landing plane, enabling it to decrease the flight time
into the potential range of fire as much as possible (MANPAD operators could
have been located close to the airport). While such methods are still used
today, they are not appropriate for civil aviation. Designers around the world
are trying to find cheaper and more efficient solutions, while several airlines
are already using on-board systems for jamming (or even destroying) missiles.
Their disadvantage is their high price tag (one to three million US dollars per
single set) [8]. The leader in this field is Israel, which, for years, has
equipped aircraft of the El Al airline with such systems. The Rafael company
has been working on such systems since 2002.
Rafael’s Britening
system has sensors for the detection of incoming missiles, which are triggered
by changes in heat in the environment. If this occurs, the Britening system
generates a powerful beam of light, which interferes with the guiding system of
the missiles [8, 9, 14, 15]. It can protect against light-guided missiles,
especially during take-off and landing, while the system works automatically.
The Britening system is based on the Aero-Gem protection system for military
helicopters, with costs of around two
million US dollars. Another similar system is the Israeli IAI/Elta Flight
Guard, which working in a similar way to the Britening system except that it
detects missiles using Doppler radar. IAI says that the Flight Guard offers 99%
efficiency and is able to operate in any weather conditions. The system weighs
60 kg, with dimensions of 306 x 361 x 207 mm, and consumes 500 W of energy
[11].
Fig. 4. C-MUSIC system on
a Boeing 737-800 belonging to El Al
Another Israeli system
of this type is the C-MUSIC. The Defence24.com portal reports [12]: “The
company Elbit Systems announced the installation of anti-missile system C-Music
on the first passenger aircraft belonging to the Israeli airline El Al. Music
or Multi Spectral Infrared Countermeasures, is a system that protects aircraft
from guided infrared missile fired with hand-held launcher. Its action depends
on detecting the firing of a missile, and blinding or the destruction of its
infrared tracking head by strong laser. Version C-Music is designed to protect
large communication aircraft. The entire system is housed in a gondola
installed below the fuselage. Due to the growing threat of civil aircraft by
hand-held launchers held by the terrorist formations, interest in this type of
systems has been growing since the beginning of the century, especially after
the incidents in Kenya in 2002. The Israeli airline El Al are among the most
threatened by terrorist attacks and therefore introduced a program to protect
their machines under the name ‘Sky Shield.’ Under this program, we installed
the first system C-Music on the Boeing 737-800 aircraft belonging to the
airline.”
Another country that
develops on-board anti-missile systems for civil aircraft is the USA. On 21
December 2008, the US Department of Defense signed a contract with BAE Systems
for this type of equipment. Under this contract, anti-missile systems were to
be installed on aircraft belonging to American Airlines flying between New York
and California [8]. The similar Guardian system has been developed by Northrop
Grumman, which is civilian variant of the AN/AAQ-24 (V) Nemesis military
system. Guardian can be placed almost anywhere on the fuselage and increases fuel
consumption by only 3-4% [8].
Fig. 5. Northrop Grumman
Guardian on a FedEx MD-11 [13]
4. SUMMARY
As indicated above, the
risk of destruction faced by civil communication aircraft by means of combat is
still prevalent. In the case of conflicts taking place in less stable
countries, where opponents are often unspecified terrorist groups, the main
risk involves the widespread use of lightweight MANPAD systems, usually in the
form of Strieła type (SA-7) shoulder rocket launchers. Such terrorist groups
are the only ones whose intent is to destroy aircraft and maximize the number
of victims in in order to increase their media exposure.
Cases from this century,
in which civilian aircraft have been shot down by heavier, vehicle-based
rockets, can be classified as tragic mistakes or the results of negligence, not
as intentional acts. That said, we must remember that there is every
possibility that these terrorist groups will gain access to such advanced
systems in the future. Heavy missile systems demand experienced crews, but the
black market is full of unemployed soldiers and officers from the former armies
of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi et al.
Given the increasing
level of instability around the world, the number of potential attacks on
communication aircraft and tragic mistakes similar to those described in this
article is likely to rise.
As such, the instability
in many countries and the prevalence of terrorist group feeding it could
represent the primary threat facing transcontinental air transport (as well as
global transportation in general) in the 21st century. Today’s modern means of
transport (especially aircraft) are already so advanced that the risk of
technical failure is minimal (especially in air transport). But we still have
no effective solution to protect transport of any kind against acts of unlawful
interference. For this to happen, we would need to stabilize the political,
social and economic situation in the troubled regions of the world, something
which is unfortunately very far away. At present, the only solution is the use
of on-board self-defence systems on communication aircraft. Such systems will
undoubtedly be developed throughout the rest of this century.
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Received 11.11.2016;
accepted in revised form 09.01.2017
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