Article
citation information:
Żukowska, A. The role of the
hydrocarbon transmission system towards achieving the status of energy
superpower in the 21st century. Scientific
Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series Transport. 2021, 110, 211-220. ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2021.110.17.
Alicja ŻUKOWSKA[1]
THE
ROLE OF THE HYDROCARBON TRANSMISSION SYSTEM TOWARDS ACHIEVING THE STATUS OF
ENERGY SUPERPOWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Summary. This article aims to
introduce the energy policy program assumptions of the Russian Federation. An
analysis led to the conclusion that the Russian Federation avails the network
of hydrocarbon transmission pipelines to obtain an energy superpower
status. The transformation of the energy sector is not restricted to measures
aimed at increasing efficiency. It similarly plays a vital role in building the
state's potential. More so, it co-creates the crucial instruments of
international influence. Through building the network of pipelines, the Kremlin
consistently attains its geopolitical aim of being an important player in
the international arena. Ineffective endeavours to get out of the Russian
domination in that area has allowed Russia to maintain its infrastructure
monopoly and dominance of Russian gas on the markets of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Keywords: Russian Federation, energy policy, transmission
system, hydrocarbons
1.
INTRODUCTION
This
study is to present the main program assumptions regarding the energy policy of
Russia. Special emphasis was placed on the employment of the energy raw
materials transmission system to attain an energy superpower status, thus, become
an important player on the international arena. The research activities
were preceded by the following thesis: The intensification of activities
in the field of energy policy is intended not only to increase budgetary
revenues but also to strengthen the international position of the Russian Federation.
Centrally controlled economy allows the Russian Federation to expand its
pipeline network on an unprecedented scale.
The
research methodology was based on the analysis of normative acts, past and
current data and literature.
2. RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH AND
21ST CENTURY
Historically,
the power of the USSR was based to a large extent on the extraction and
exploitation of oil and natural gas. Hydrocarbons were a significant policy
instrument. The breakdown of the Soviet Union led to an economic crisis.
Additionally, the drop in oil and gas prices (USD 20-30 / barrel) affected the
energy sector. At the same instant, the outdated infrastructure and commitments
of the former Soviet Union caused Russia's export capacity for these raw
materials to significantly decrease. The basic document regulating the
post-Soviet system of administering Russian natural resources was introduced in
1992 as the "Strategy for the Energy Development of the Russian
Federation". In December 1994, the "Energy Development Strategy of
the Russian Federation (main assumptions)" was approved by the government.
In May 1995, the President of the Russian Federation issued a decree entitled
"Main guidelines for energy policy and restructuring of the fuel and
energy industry of the Russian Federation for the years up to 2010", and
in October "The main guidelines for the energy strategy of the Russian
Federation" were approved [5,p.119].
The
growth of the energy sector in the years 2000–2003 was prompted by the
investment freedom of large national oil companies as well as the increasing
demand for oil and gas, consequently, rocketing prices of these raw materials
on foreign markets. In addition, Russia had to struggle with the diminution of
resources in Western Siberia and a decline in production growth. The other
hindering factors were: a new division of ownership in the sector, meagre
condition of the pipeline network and deficient capacity of export pipelines,
unsatisfactory investments of oil companies in resource recovery, deterioration
of the resource base, state monopoly in the field of crude oil transport,
excessive fiscalism, inconsistent regulatory system, no guarantee of investment
security, high level of corruption [13].
3.
STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS IN THE FIELD OF RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR
Since
W. Putin came to power, territorial expansion has been replaced by energy
expansion. President Putin, motivated by the need to build up the presidential
office's position with other political actors in Russia, introduced a wide-ranging
program of socio-economic development of Russia until 2010. The basic premise
of the document was to take steps to strengthen the authority of the central
government, lessening the gap between Russia and other developed countries and
sanctioning Russia's position as one of the world leaders [14, p.114]. The presented policy was based on the thesis
that the fundamental Russian national interest was to retain the status of a
superpower able to create international order in a supra-regional dimension
[10, p.42]. In 2003, the government of the Russian
Federation adopted Russia's Energy Strategy until 2020. The main objective of
the energy strategy was to maximise the effective use of natural energy
resources and the potential of the energy sector to sustain economic growth,
improve quality of life, and strengthen Russia's foreign economic positions.
The energy factor has become a fundamental element of national security,
conditioned by the functioning of the national energy sector [2, p.4]. An increase in world oil prices, based on which gas
prices are indexed, was a factor conducive to the implementation of the energy
strategy, allowing the transformation of Russia, "from a non-functional
military power into a new energy power” [6]. According to the provisions
of the Russian Federation's Energy Strategy until 2020, Western Europe remained
the key direction of oil and gas exports from Russia. The emphasis was put on
transit countries; however, the clear desire to become independent from them by
building offshore pipelines was also marked. The significant development of the
Asian direction was similarly noted. During the meeting of the Security Council
of the Russian Federation held in December 2015, President Putin outlined the
concept of Russia as an "energy superpower". It was noted that:
"Energy is the most important driving force of global economic
development. It has always been so and will remain so for a long time"[9].
The concept of Russia emerged as an "energy superpower" based on
state-controlled energy companies. The core of the energy strategy due to the
specificity of gas trade is primarily the state monopolist in all gas market
segments in Russia – Gazprom [11, p.85].
According
to the provisions of the energy strategy of 2003, the main objective of
political influence on the so-called close to abroad countries was to develop
their energy transmission systems and force economic cooperation leading to the
abandonment of projects [10, p.49]. Various
(economic, political, including military) instruments were applied on countries
attempting to gain real political sovereignty (Georgia and Ukraine)[2].
Towards the second group of countries in the region, considered as potential
partners, a two-track policy was involved. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are examples
of such countries. Because of their geographical location, these countries
found themselves in the sphere of influence of not only Russian but China as
well. Therefore, Russian policy concerning these countries varied, depending on
the relationship with China. Russian policy then was aimed at their political
and economic domination. This objective was accomplished by significant
investments and supporting the development of the mining sector and the
expansion of the energy storage and transport system.
The
provisions of the strategy were revised as a result of the economic crisis and
the lapse of the five-year period. In 2009, a new strategy was adopted, the
Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, which expanded and
specified the provisions of the preceding document. The 2009 Energy Strategy
pointed to the need for a measurable increase in the extraction and export of
energy resources and far-reaching modernization modernisation of the Russian
energy sector. The provisions of the Strategy included the requirement of
increasing Russia's share in the global energy market to strengthen the
country's political role in the international arena.
According
to the 2009 document, EU Member States continued being Russia's key market for
oil and gas; however, it is noteworthy that the share of Asian countries in
Russian exports of these raw materials has been systematically expanding. The
Russian energy strategy until 2030 estimated that gas exports in 2030 will
expand by 154-159 billion m3 compared to
2010. It projected that in the initial period of implementation of the strategy
(until 2020), most of the surplus raw material would be bought by customers
from Europe. In the following term (by 2030), it would be targeted at the Far
Eastern market, which would predictably shape sales of approximately 70-75
billion m3 of gas to customers from China, Korea or
Japan. Eventually, PRC was to become the main receiver of Russian gas. The
"Energy Strategy until 2030" assumed that 22-25% of exported oil and
19-20% of exported gas should go to Asia. To implement those assumptions,
efforts were made to allow oil distribution via pipeline to China and the
Pacific Coast; gas supplies via pipelines to China and both Korean countries;
development of LNG installations for the needs of the Asian market [8,p.65]. On May 1, 2014, in Shanghai, in the presence of
the presidents of Russia and China, the representatives of Gazprom and the
Chinese energy company, CNPC, signed an agreement on
supplies of Russian gas to China. The thirty-year contract stipulates the
export of 38 billion m3 of gas yearly from
the Russian East Siberian deposits (Chayanda and Kovykta) via the Siberia Force pipeline (Power of Siberia
1), which was put into use in December 2019. Moreover, Russia expressed its
desire to carry out the Altai project (according to Gazprom's new terminology -
Power of Siberia 2), the Western Route (gas supplies from Western Siberia to northwestern China via the Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok
gas pipeline). A memorandum amongst the Russian Gazprom and the Chinese CNPC was signed in 2015 [7, p. 37].
In
the period 2001-2014, over 20,000 km of gas pipelines were created in Russia,
which significantly stimulated the increase in the level of gasification.
Against this background, the existent domestic gas transit infrastructure
became remarkably impoverished. For many years, Gazprom invested mostly in the
building of new export buses without regard to the renovation of the national
infrastructure.
As
claimed by the 2020 energy strategy, Russia is expected to become the leading
provider of energy resources, warranting transnational energy security. To this
end, Russia has attempted a consummate geopolitical pipeline strategy,
encompassing the creation of transmission directions advantageous to the
Kremlin and obstructing plans thwarting or disrupting its domination [7, p.
29-31].
Russia's
crucial interests have involved the establishment of an integrated energy and
energy transport infrastructure in the bordering regions of Europe and Asia,
the buildout of international energy transfer systems, and safeguarding
non-discriminatory energy transportation. To apply this supposition, prompt
action was taken to set up the following transmission facilities:
- construction of the oil pipeline connecting Eastern Siberia
- the Pacific Ocean;
- construction of the "Sever" and "Yug" pipelines;
- construction of "Severniy Potok" (Nord Stream) and "Yuzhniy
Potok" (South Stream) gas pipelines;
- the construction of a transit gas pipeline connecting Europe
with the Yamal Peninsula was completed;
- seaport infrastructure and liquid hydrocarbon transport
systems (oil, condensate, liquefied natural gas, etc.) were developed.
A
vital role was performed by the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline. It was set up in
1994 and put into service in 1999; however, the maximum level of transmission
capacity (33 billion m3 of gas per year) was
accomplished in 2006. From then on, the gas pipeline was heavily exploited.
In
2002, the Blue Stream gas pipeline was constructed and built with a total
capacity of 16 billion m3 at the estimated cost of
2.4 billion USD, exporting gas directly from Russia via the Black Sea to
Turkey.
Nord
Stream is the third key pipeline connecting to Europe. In September 2005,
Gazprom, in cooperation with German BASF and E.ON,
entered into an initial contract on the building of a gas pipeline from Russia
to Germany. Its construction started on April 9, 2010, the first line has
operated since November 8, 2011, the second from October 2012.
One
of the objectives stated in the Energy Strategy 2030 is creating infrastructure
enabling production and distribution of LNG. Currently, sole gas liquefaction
plant exists in Russia, initiated in 2009 within the framework of the Sakhalin
2 project. The venture's investors are Gazprom (50% plus 1 share), the
Dutch-British Royal Dutch Shell (27.5% minus 1 share), Japanese companies
Mitsui and Mitsubishi (12.5% and 10% shares, respectively). The other
prioritised pipeline is Yamal LNG project, which was built in cooperation with:
Novatek - the largest gas producer in Russia after
Gazprom (50.1% shares), the French group, Total (20% shares), the Chinese
group, CNPC (20% shares) and the Chinese Silk Road
Fund (9.9% shares). Gazprom declared schemes to construct two gas liquefaction
plants: in the Russian Far East as part of the Vladivostok LNG project and in
the Baltic Sea as part of the Baltic LNG project [7, p. 12].
Consolidating
Russia's position of strength in global energy trade required high and constant
revenues from the energy carriers on the European market. Russia, for obtaining
a superior position on the European and Central Asian markets expanded its
markets for its energy resources. Actions were taken to build new transmission
installations detouring countries opposed to the Russian concept of the
European fuel market, particularly Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States. North
Stream became the venture that deprived Poland and Belarus of the status of
transit countries, directly connecting the Russian supplier with its German
recipient via the Baltic Sea. This project significantly weakened the
negotiating position of these countries with Gazprom, which ruthlessly pursues
Russian interests, persistently forcing new gas pipeline projects focused on
forming regional gas axes (Nord Stream 1, South Stream, Turkish Stream, Nord
Stream 2) [7,p.34]. More so, it should be noted that
these projects were not always profitable. In many cases, their motivation was
purely political. This is perfectly illustrated by the activities related to
the North Stream project[3],
which made EU countries even more reliant on Russia’s gas supplies,
exposing the fragile solidarity of EU countries defied by bilateral agreements
[1, p. 261-273].
By
taking over the network of pipelines running through the territory of the
Russian Federation from the Caspian Sea region and the countries of Central
Asia, the Kremlin is taking far-reaching measures to block the creation of
alternative transport routes. Russia is masterly using the political
opportunities offered by trading in natural resources. It seems that, in the
Kremlin's opinion, they are much more effective than using military potential,
the use of which may always meet with retaliation. The blockage of gas and oil
supplies leaves the other actors with no means of putting pressure on Russia.
This allowed the Russian Federation entangling Europe with a gas pipeline
network, to build a potential much more effective than military means [3, p.
99].
The
EU Member States' response to Russia's energy expansion was supposed to be the
construction of the Nabucco[4] gas
pipeline. The project assumed liberation from Russian gas supplies, and thus,
augmenting energy security. However, for many reasons, this project was not
finalised. The first reason for the failure of this project was the
implementation of the energy mix, calling for the increased use of renewable
energy. The economic crisis also contributed to the blocking of the discussed
project. More so, the failure of the Nabucco gas
pipeline was significantly influenced by weaknesses resulting from the
decision-making process of the European Union, and above all, the lack of a
unified position on the issue of a common energy policy. All this worked to the
advantage of the Kremlin, which, while having an infrastructure monopoly,
maintained the dominance of Russian gas on the markets of Central and Eastern
Europe. Worth of note as well is that the described situation proved favourable
for Russia in connection to the concept of the South Stream gas pipeline, crossing
the Black Sea, connecting the coasts of Russia and Bulgaria. The first line was
to transport gas via Serbia to Hungary, Slovenia and Austria [12]. In December
2014, Russia renounced the South Stream, on behalf of the different forms of
collaboration with Turkey - Turkish Stream, leading to Turkey and further to
the Greek border instead of via the Black Sea to Bulgaria [17, p. 77]. On
October 10, 2016, President Putin paid a visit to Istanbul, during which the
intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the Turkish Stream gas
pipeline was signed (ratified by Turkey and Russia in December 2016 and
February 2017). Subsequently, contracts were concluded between South Stream
Transport B.V. controlled by Gazprom and Allseas Group AG for the building of two offshore lines of
the gas pipeline. This investment follows Russia's vital interests, depriving
Ukraine and Belarus of the status of a transit state while bypassing the Baltic
States [7, p. 36].
4. NEW DIRECTIONS OF THE EXPANSION
The
Arctic Zone belonging to RF has potentially 200 gas and oil reserves. Global
warming is a factor that encourages action in this area, making access to
deposits easier. An additional impulse for intensifying plans of exploitation
is undoubtedly the increase in raw material prices on world markets. Russia's
plans include acquiring technology for the extraction of raw materials and the
development of land infrastructure. However, these plans are primarily hampered
by the lack of the necessary capital for the very demanding drilling in the
Arctic region. Moreover, Russia still lacks modern technology. Russian oil
extracted from the Arctic, called Arctic Oil (ARCO), entered
the global market in 2014. It comes from the newly built only Prirazłomnaja platform in the Pecs Sea [16, p. 135].
In 2014, Russian crude oil extracted in the Arctic from the only Prirazłomnaja platform in the Pechora Sea entered the
world market. To strengthen its position, the Russian Federation undertook
international activities aimed at extending its borders and taking over 1.2
million km2 under its jurisdiction in the
Arctic Ocean. A scientific expedition completed in the fall of 2014 collected
samples taken from the bottom of the Arctic Ocean showing that the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range extending to
the North Pole, is a continuation of the continental shelf. The strengthening
of the military presence in this area was noticeable as the military bases were
reactivated from the times of the USSR located there. In April 2014, President
Putin ordered the establishment of a group of submarines and surface ships,
strengthening the border in the Arctic. Similarly, steps were taken to increase
the region's export opportunities. As such, the ordinance of June 14, 2019,
providing for an increase in the Arctic transport corridor at the base of the
Northern Sea Route, through giving the Dikson seaport
the status of an international port and intensified its transhipment capacity
(construction of the terminal) for crude oil.
5.
CURRENT STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS SETTING THE ENERGY POLICY
In
connection with the end of another five years, the Energy Strategy was revised.
New circumstances were considered, the sanctions imposed on Russia after the
annexation of Crimea, the conditions introduced in the Third EU Climate
Package, and finally, the American concepts of liquefied gas exports and the
shale revolution. Apart from the postulates to reduce the energy consumption of
the economy and to build and modernise the infrastructure of the fuel and
energy industry to implement development programs and export concepts of the
Russian Federation, the 2015 Strategy introduced a significant novelty; the
requirement to correlate individual sectoral policies. The new strategy assumed
a departure from the pro-export approach, a characteristic of the previous
documents, towards a more rational use of hydrocarbons. The strategy outlines
two main goals related to the pursuit of the energy superpower status. First,
maintaining control over the transmission and storage system, both by
regulating the transmission price and storage costs, and the fact that state
monopolies are the administrator of transmission services. The second goal was
to increase export opportunities, inter alia, by developing the capacity to
transport liquefied gas. The above assumptions determinated
the transport policy. The regulation of the government of the Russian
Federation of March 18, 2016, defined the key projects supporting the transport
of hydrocarbons in newly adopted directions. The construction of new seaports
(including on the Yamal Peninsula), the construction of icebreakers and the
connection of seaports with other transport infrastructure became priorities.
Regulation No. 2101 of the Government of the Russian Federation of September
30, 2018, assumed activities for the development of transport of crude oil and
its refined products as well as gas and gas condensate, development of
pipelines (as part of the "North" project) to increase the supply of
crude oil products to the port of Primorsk. The
far-eastern direction of expansion was also observed in the context of creating
transport policy, which was reflected, among others, in the content of the
Government of the Russian Federation No. 436 of 14 March 2019 on the investment
project for the construction of a liquefied gas transhipment terminal in the
Kamchatka Region.
Significant
changes in the energy policy of the Russian Federation took place in 2019. The
legal basis for the current energy policy is the Energy Security Doctrine of
the Russian Federation. The key objective set out in this document was to
ensure the country's energy security, particularly, to protect Russia's
political and economic interests. Such a definition of the strategic goal is
consistent with the provisions of the document of a broader scope, Economic
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, which assumes that
Russia is to transform into a modern state, resistant to economic fluctuations,
capable of dominating sales markets and gaining production capacity in areas
affecting energy safety. Also, this document indicates that economic sanctions
resulting from the annexation of Crimea, which limits the inflow of capital and
access to modern technologies, are important challenges. Russia's position may
also be threatened by the dynamic situation in the world economy and the
positioning of Asian countries as a centre of economic development. The current
trend of energy policies of developed countries towards a green, low-carbon and
energy-saving economy was, not overlooked. What remains unchanged, and is
emphasised in each of the discussed documents is the belief that energy policy
and the potential of the fuel and energy sector are key instruments of Russian
security policy and serve to shape the international order and determine the
political position of the state.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Over the last two decades, the energy policy of the
Russian Federation has evolved significantly. Strategic documents based on
long-term forecasts have, as a matter of fact, undoubtedly contributed to the
implementation of its assumptions. The goals specified therein are not only of
a strategic nature but also indicate operational elements. In addition, they
are regularly updated, allowing for flexibility. It is worth noting that energy
policy is not carried out in isolation. It is related to the transport and
security policy. This undoubtedly contributes to its implementation. All major
investment projects are supervised by the central authorities, which guarantees
its success. Another propitious factor is that the Russian political scene is
very stable. This enables the consistent implementation of the energy policy
objectives and related sector policies.
The changes
within the energy policy resulted from the necessity to adapt the Kremlin's
actions to the prevailing conditions. Hence, they are now focused on adapting
export policies to global hydrocarbon demand. The basic challenge faced by the
Russian Federation in this respect is the fluctuations in prices of raw
materials and the resulting decline in revenues from hydrocarbons exports.
Another important obstacle in the implementation of strategic goals may be
insufficient expenditure on modernisation of the transmission infrastructure and the energy
industry. The sanctions imposed by the EU after the annexation of Crimea are
also important, as they significantly limit the inflow of the necessary capital
and technology, which are so important for the process of modernising the energy industry. In conclusion, the above factors
may significantly limit the Russian Federation's ability to influence.
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Received 09.07.2020; accepted in revised
form 02.11.2020
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