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Ivaylo ANGELOV

“POOLING AND SHARING” OR “INTELLIGENT DEFENCE” IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY

Summary. The European Union is focusing on military capabilities and the fight against terrorism, but to a lesser extent on employment opportunities for immigrant integration, human rights and peace-building and the sustainability of countries and societies in Europe and around it. The European Union has always been proud of its soft power and will continue to do so in the area of security and defence. On the other hand, the idea of Europe as an extremely “civilian power” does not correspond to the changing reality. In this regard, the EU will need to deepen its transatlantic relationship and its partnership with NATO.

Keywords: pooling and sharing, intelligent defence, security, defence

1. INTRODUCTION

None of the countries in the world has the power or resources to deal with threats alone and to take advantage of the opportunities of our time. In these difficult times, a strong alliance is one who thinks strategically, shares a common vision and acts together. The aim of the European Union is to play a major role on a global scale as a guarantor of global security. However, to be able to meet the needs of its citizens and make its partnerships fruitful, it should work together and unite with other players in the field of security and defence.
The European Union is focusing on military capabilities and the fight against terrorism, but to a lesser extent on employment opportunities for immigrant integration, human rights and peace-building and the sustainability of countries and societies in Europe and around it. The European Union has always been proud of its soft power and will continue to do so in the area of security and defence. On the other hand, the idea of Europe as an extremely "civilian power" does not correspond to the changing reality. In this regard, the EU needs to deepen its transatlantic relationship and its partnership with NATO.

A look at the key NATO and EU security and defence documents, confirms that the Berlin plus agreements are the basis for the practical interaction between NATO and the EU in crisis management operations. The Berlin plus agreement enables NATO structures, mechanisms and tools to be used to conduct European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions.

The EU and NATO interaction in the field of security under analysis clearly indicates the need for an in-depth observation between the relationship of the two alliances and the processes of post-conflict recovery and crisis resolution.

On this basis, conclusions can be drawn on whether the modern security environment implies a better interaction between the EU and NATO, which in turn will contribute to the need to strategically rethink the security environment and modernise the European Security Strategy.

2. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO IN POST-CONFLICT PROCESSING AND CRITICISING CRISIS

Present post-conflict recovery and crisis resolution are important in terms of non-military means and in view of the new EU Lisbon Treaty provisions.

The process of post-conflict recovery includes diplomatic, political, military and economic factors. Efforts should be directed on the one hand to ensuring stability and ending hostilities, and on the other hand, to national and international factors that, in the long run, coordinate peace by effective justice and reforms in the institutions and economies of a given country. Ensuring security as a major task is linked to both disarmament and the process of reforms in this area, which in most cases involves the creation of a new organisational structure for the army, border guards and police.

The next aspect is the process of reforming the judiciary, establishing the rule of law, protecting human rights and prosecuting the culprits, respectively. The challenge of this process lies in the coordination of the various measures that would be taken to stabilise the countries in the short and long terms and which should be accepted and supported by the majority of the population2.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall within NATO, a process of adapting policies, strategy, military potential and internal structure to the new geopolitical realities began. In the adopted treaty in April 1999, NATO's strategy declared Alliance support for economic recovery and democracy in regions affected by armed conflicts, as well as the determination to participate in the post-conflict reconstruction process. According to the NATO concept, peacekeeping operations are multifunctional and they comprise a set of political, economic, social and military measures to eradicate the negative consequences of the conflict and subsequent stabilisation.

The establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy within the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy is linked to a commitment by the Community to participate in a number of peacekeeping missions. At this stage, however, there is still a lack of full coordination between the different European institutions and the Member States regarding European foreign policy. Only after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty were steps taken in this direction, given the innovations related to the extension of the so-Petersburg tasks with peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery missions.

With a view to deepening co-operation in crisis management, a consistent approach was sought to mutually strengthen and uphold the autonomy of decision-making of both organisations – NATO and the EU.

In this connection, progress has been made at the political level. There was an intense Ashton-Rasmussen dialogue, their participation in meetings of the respective organisation and joint meetings on the Middle East situation. The tradition of dialogue was adopted by their successors, Mogerini - Stoltenberg.

Regarding operations, an exchange of basic planning documents, the provision of EU material from the NATO Satellite Center, and day-to-day contacts at the operational level are monitored when the two organisations work together in a particular region.

Concerning the development of military capabilities, there exist strong political interests on both sides to avoid duplication of forces and resources, given the serious financial constraints that are of particular importance.

Based on the above, in order to ensure a targeted response and crisis management to fill the gap between heavy military intervention and long-term stabilisation and recovery initiatives, member states need to “capitalise” and take advantage of the wide range of instruments, which the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides. The establishment and development of stable working EU-NATO relations help to improve the realisation of their joint goals in the field of security. Considering the current financial restrictions, it is necessary to ensure that NATO intelligent defence initiatives and EU pooling and sharing capabilities are complementary and supportive.

3. EU “UNION AND SHARING” INSTITUTIONS AND NATO “INTELLIGENT DEFENCE” INSTITUTIONS

The modern security environment implies better synergy, successful cooperation and complementarity between NATO and the EU through intelligent defence, pooling and sharing capabilities to ensure an adequate response to security threats in the 21st century.

3.1. Merge and share

The idea of pooling and sharing was announced in December 2008 by the EU Defence Ministers in the Declaration of Abilities. In April 2010, the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, in the format of defence ministers, adopted the general framework objective of the merger and sharing initiative and endorsed the roadmap for its implementation.3

3 Merging and sharing capabilities across the EU.
On 9 December 2010, the Council adopted conclusions on the development of military capabilities in which member states are encouraged to systematically conduct analysis of their national military capabilities and structures with a view to identifying those capable of being co-developed through the approach of merge and share.

On 3 February 2011, a seminar was held in Budapest (rotating president of the EU Council at that time in Hungary), where a common understanding of the concept of pooling and sharing capabilities was achieved. The effectiveness of the initiative to preserve and develop military capabilities in a European format and the need for political will to implement it was confirmed.

The concept of capability sharing and cost-sharing provides an opportunity for existing capabilities to become more cost-effective and operationally efficient.

According to the European Defence Agency, the merger and sharing approach can be dual-use, both military and civilian in the field of technology.

In recent years, three important highlights have stressed the need for the reassessment of the concept of unification and sharing.

Firstly, the Lisbon treaty introducing the so-called “Permanent structured cooperation”. Permanent structured defence co-operation does not duplicate NATO activities of member states that are both in the two allies; rather it is a concept for countries that want closer cooperation and ability to act in the field of military activities. Its main objective was to enhance the EU’s operational potential through cooperation and interaction between member states. At this stage, the governments of the countries do not have a clear vision of permanent structured defence co-operation, having two options: either to merge existing military projects or to initiate new ones. In this regard, the SCP is currently being considered as the only instrument allowing for closer cooperation between member states expressing their willingness to become part of the permanent process without being hindered by those who may hold opposing views, while at the same time achieving goals that could not be implemented by individual countries.

Simultaneously, the European Defence Agency, on its part, should continue its work on the merger initiative by realising:
- a level-based, high-level discussion to specify the state’s intentions, pooling and sharing opportunities;
- carrying out analyses to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the projects and programs being developed, the exchange of experience and information on possible future consolidation;
- identify legal, technical and financial instruments that need to be developed to support the implementation of projects and programs under the merger and sharing initiative.

Secondly, the adoption of the so-called “Defence Package” of the European Commission (EC), containing measures that are binding on member states, which mainly includes two directives:
- Directives 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 aimed at simplifying the export controls on defence-related products within the EU;

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The adoption of both directives (2009/43/EC and 2009/81/EC) aims to simplify procedures for the movement of military goods between member states and to increase and establish more opportunities for defence procurement and competition in the EU.

Thirdly, the adoption of the Ghent Framework in December 2010, which was expected to be a sustainable strategic framework for systematic exchange of defence planning information in the member states, as a basis for consultation and coordination from the bottom up, on a voluntary basis.

The Ghent Framework provided a political platform for member states to benefit from the basic legal instruments at their disposal - 'permanent structured cooperation' and two Directives - 43/81. The Gent framework engages the debate on defence budgets in Europe, emphasising that the only way to reduce them is through “intelligent” (using the NATO vocabulary) forms of cooperation and avoiding circumstances dictated by circumstances that do not resolve existing strategic deficits.

The Framework aims to identify and assess the military capabilities of the member states in three categories:
- capabilities to be maintained at the national level, with enhanced compatibility and operational capability.
- ability to “pool”;
- capabilities that may serve as both role sharing and targeted “sharing”.

Against this background, European NATO member states and CSDP builders should define their potential, in view of the fact that it should be permanent and structured rather than incidental and vaguely defined. This is the reason the Ghent Framework should create a platform for new initiatives to build joint capabilities.

The Ghent framework is based on three political conditions:
- avoids sensitive policy issues such as the creation of command and control structures, a European military base;
- acts in accordance with the transatlantic agenda, this implies pursuing the European road to “intelligent” defence, “3D” rule in EU-NATO relations - not to duplicate, divide, discriminate;
- keeps public expectations low, that is, avoiding the automatic adoption of the “uniting and sharing” initiative with the creation of a European army.

The Gent Framework outlines four principles that contribute to productive cooperation:
- transparency of projects and their risks;
- strategic approach to capabilities and complementarity in the light of NATO agenda;
- harmonisation of technical collateral;
- depolitisation of the decision-making process.

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To date, we can say that the EU member states are still pursuing their defence planning with a high degree of isolation. The top-down approach is a necessity for achieving visible results, not in the sense of Brussels imposing decisions on the member states, but in the sense of the responsibility and commitment of the defence ministers for greater convergence of forces, so that the overall goals of security and capabilities are met.

3.2. Intelligent defence

The essence of intelligent defence is to provide greater security than the Allies did, working together with less money at higher levels of flexibility\(^8\).

The intelligent defence concept supports development and capability development projects, especially from the areas identified in the defence planning process as key. This group includes both accepted projects before and after the formulation of the initiative, reflecting the principles set out in it.

The initial package of multinational projects is the so-called Group 1 project and is characterised by the presence of a leading nation, confirmed participating countries and a range of projects adopted by these countries:
- NATO Anti-Missile Defence Project
  The NATO Alliance's capability in the broadest sense is the ability of the Alliance's military structures to make effective use of the available ODA funds for the exchange and assessment of the situation and to act to offset limited ballistic threats within a standing watch. In order to declare availability, two conditions are needed: first, NATO must have the necessary military capacity and capabilities, and second, the necessary political and regulatory platform has to be developed. The military assets to cover NATO's covert task and protect Europe's population, territory and sites from ballistic missiles are a radar sensor, an Eagles anti-missile system located on a ship and patrolling in the Mediterranean Sea and NATO's command and management system. The announcement of NATO's capability is a step in the primary responsibility of the state and political leadership of the states towards their peoples, namely, to cover and protect the population and territory of the member states, with a viable allied armed force and technique, through mechanisms of collective protection and cooperation with partners. This ability evolved over the years by refining the used interceptors of the PRO and expanding their number on the territory of Europe - in Romania (2015) and Poland (2018).

  - Joint Intelligence and Monitoring (JISR) / Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) project
    This initiative aims to compensate and eliminate the missing critical capabilities regarding the exchange of information and the availability of qualified personnel for Joint Intelligence and Surveillance. Its implementation takes place in three main directions: building a network environment for the exchange of intelligence information including the AGS main operational base, a review of existing NATO-wide procedures for the exchange of information and the degree of interoperability between the parties, training and staff training.

  - NATO's project for the approach to airspace protection
    Balancing air defence achievements and special treaties with Albania, Luxembourg and Slovenia provide an example of intelligent defence.

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\(^{8}\) Statement, issued by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Standing Committee on supporting a shared approach to Capabilities in Chicago. 2 April, 2012.
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The implementation of these projects aims to build a long-term, coherent and joint intelligent defence approach that includes:
- avoiding a subsequent reduction in defence capabilities by filling existing deficits and investing in new capabilities in order to avoid subsequent discrepancies;
- collective prioritisation;
- complementing the process of planning NATO-led national and defence-related policies and budgets through broad Allied consultations;
- promoting synergies between Alliance's intelligent defence projects and EU pooling and sharing initiatives to ensure their coordination and complementarity;
- promoting cooperation in the fields of research, development, public procurement;
- encourage more active use of joint NATO funding for joint projects by offering ways of guaranteed access to shared resources;
- involving Alliance partners in support of NATO-led operations and building a successful model for strategic air capabilities

Intelligent defence initiatives provide for the preservation of existing military capabilities, and continued acquisition of new capabilities, with the goal of effectively prioritising NATO's national interests. This concept implies national solutions and consensus to harmonise defence actions and costs, team and supply specialisation.

NATO alliances have long experience in co-building military capabilities and in optimising military budgets, such as the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the Strategic Airlift, the AWACS based on common investments in military infrastructure and in shared capabilities.

In addition to pragmatism and the “cost-effectiveness” analysis of intelligent defence enforcement, it is related to the introduction of a new culture of cooperation and a change in NATO and Allies' approach to capacity development and maintenance of existing ones, through new strategic thinking and long-commitment. For it to be workable and sustainable in time, it should be based on trust among the Allies, exchange of information, the complementarity of resources, and unified coordination.

Presently, the concept is realised through consultations with NATO and the Allies to coordinate the negotiation and implementation of multinational projects. Thus, the approach is understood and perceived positively, however, in practice, still, intelligent defence is seen only as a possible option, and not as an obligation of the member states.

Given the sensitive nature of conceptual components, the specialisation section explicitly clarifies the right of states to make sovereign defence decisions.

3.3. Challenges to the reconciliation of the two initiatives

In this regard, considering the two EU capabilities, cost-sharing initiatives and NATO intelligent defence, they create prerequisites for optimising the available resources and capabilities and exchanging experience that the smaller member states of the two unions could not accumulate on their own. Thus, through specialising and training of their armed forces value is added to the overall defence potential.

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Therefore, NATO Strategic Concept also notes that one of the key elements of the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership is the development and interoperability of the capabilities of the member states.

The objective picture of NATO capabilities shows that at present:
- the budgets of most of the allies are limited - 18 spent less in 2011 than in 2008 with 15 of them European;
- there is cessation, delay or delays in major equipment projects, and a number of abilities are abandoned;
- there is a limitation on training in some countries;
- personnel redundancies are observed in many countries;
- only three Allies spent 2% or more of their defence GDP in 2011. Seventeen spent 1.5% or less in 2011;
- the United States provided 77% of the Alliance spending, compared to 2001, which was 63%\(^{10}\).

At the same time, the EU has no permanent army. Instead, in the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it relies on constituted contingencies for specific cases by member states for:
- joint disarmament operations;
- humanitarian and evacuation missions;
- military advice and assistance missions;
- conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions;
- military crisis management missions, including peacekeeping missions and post-conflict stabilisation operations.

In this respect, the prerequisite for the success of the two concepts is the need for political will and trust between member states, as well as the tendency to modernise their defence capabilities to give impetus to the three main areas of interaction:
- broadening of political consultations;
- practical cooperation in operations;
- developing capabilities, avoiding duplication, optimising and sharing costs.

In this context, the challenges of combining the two initiatives are:
- the initiatives are conceptually of the same approach, but for two different organisations. The EU and NATO are different in terms of membership, nature, objectives, structures, activities and history. Sceptics claim that a direct political agenda between them is difficult, as there is no formal institutional link, and this in practice means 28 NATO countries impose their will on Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta or the other 28 EU member states impose their will on the USA, Canada, Turkey, Norway, Iceland and Albania\(^{11}\);
- the United States is a member of NATO, which allocates significant financial resources to defence and develop new technologies and capabilities, as opposed to part of the EU member states of the Union;

\(^{10}\) Defence Spending Trends and Implications for NATO, Frank Boland, Director of Planning Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO International Staff, 13 February 2012.

- the major obstacle faced by NATO-CSDP relations is the political contradictions between Turkey and Cyprus. In this regard, despite the official interactions between the CSDP and NATO, nothing guarantees the EU that Turkey will cooperate with the CSDP in situations where it would feel a threat to its own interests in the field of security. In fact, as can be seen in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, the CSDP and NATO act together, but that is only because of their common goals. Because Turkey itself is still in the process of defining its strategic objectives in the current situation, it prefers to follow its line in the CSDP-NATO relations.

In this context, there is still a predominant view that the relationship between the two organisations is unsatisfactory and not sufficiently functional. Furthermore, they should be involved together in operations, avoid competition and rivalry, achieve synergy and a high level of coherence among themselves.

The three key steps in this direction should be:
- common perception of threats and common priorities;
- pooling and sharing capabilities;
- better coordination of efforts for both member states and the two NATO-EU organisations, respectively.

4. CONCLUSION

In view of the key documents- the EU Lisbon Treaty and the 2010 Strategic Concept of NATO, it is clear that they provide a good basis and an opportunity for closer cooperation between the two allies. Although currently there are mechanisms of interaction between the EU and NATO and despite the declared willingness to cooperate, they act rather independently of each other (not in competition), forming a strategic vision within each organisation and not in the general context. Interaction and complementarity is formally documented and has a declarative character, but virtually no harmonisation of capabilities is observed. There is need for a better-coordinated and timely response to crises and conflicts, an overall assessment of risks and threats, and a complementary approach in the process of overcoming and specialising and profiling the two allies according to their strengths.

There are a number of reasons for this:
- tensions between Cyprus and Turkey;
- interests of the military industry in certain member states;
- desire of some countries for a European army and a greater EU autonomy in the field of security and defence;
- follow-up by the European Commission on its own agenda;
- different views of the Alliance’s own representatives on the idea of an autonomous EU defence.

These symptoms, on the one hand, are perceived by international actors on the international stage and allow for an individual approach and bilateral interactions between member states and third countries that do not always correspond to a common strategic Euro-Atlantic vision.
On the other hand, it is the occasion for the member states to demonstrate a different approach in both formats. This shows the key role that national states have in both organisations and which should be considered when assessing EU-NATO cooperation. These, in turn, lead to the identification of certain shortcomings.

Firstly, the absolute weight of each state in NATO and the EU in the decision-making process on security and defence issues. Given the high sensitivity of the public and the states in this area, due cognizance of the importance of dual democratic control in the sector should be noted. On the part of civil society, whose attitudes and media coverage affect decision-makers and, on the other hand, parliaments that play a key role in the process of adopting defence budgets, as well as control of the sector.

National states, regardless of their size, degree of economic development and resource security, have the right to block the processes within and between themselves. The tension between Cyprus and Turkey and the blocking of Berlin in practice is a typical example.

Secondly, the idea of building a system of mutual interchangeability of forces is difficult to achieve at this time because of differences in policies and the level of ambitions and abilities of the two organisations, respectively. NATO and the EU are inherently alliances, and at the same time close to each other, in view of the member states that belong to them and the values they profess. They represent the backbone of Europe, guaranteeing the stability, development, peace and security of citizens and states of the old continent. However, this is simultaneously happening, each fulfilling every one of its agendas and using a different toolbox, respectively. In view of the current reality, the emphasis should be shifted from mutual interchangeability to complementarity of forces.

Thirdly, the focus of the two union's cooperation on energy security and the vulnerability of its critical infrastructure, as well as the so- global goods - sea, air, space and cyber, which are of strategic importance to the EU and NATO both militarily and economically. Unless close synergy and complementarity is achieved based on cooperation, policy and preparedness, the need for these key resources will lead to competition, difficult governance, the vulnerability of EU and NATO member states, and new complex conflicts by state and non-state actors.

Consequently, in view of the new security architecture, the complex, hybrid nature of threats and risks, there is a need to deepen the EU-NATO relationship in the area of security, to ensure world peace.

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