Article
citation information:
Nowak, J., Ogonowski, K., Kustra, M. Selected
threats to civil aviation. Scientific Journal of Silesian
University of Technology. Series Transport. 2019, 102, 141-150. ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2019.102.12.
Jacek NOWAK[1], Krzysztof OGONOWSKI[2], Marek KUSTRA[3]
SELECTED THREATS TO CIVIL AVIATION
Summary. The aim of this article is to
discuss issues related to threats to civil aviation. The authors describe a
relatively fresh subject which has been neglected so far due to the lack of
knowledge and low popularity of this type of threat. The work identifies and
characterises new threats to civil aviation. In order to achieve this aim, the
article contains defined possibilities of using anti-aircraft mines and methods
of using anti-aircraft rocket sets against civil aircraft in the operational
area of the airport. The threats resulting from the use of unmanned aerial
systems in the operational area of the airport are described together with the
use of the cyberspace in a criminal manner in relation to civil aviation.
Keywords: anti-aircraft mines,
portable anti-aircraft missile sets, unmanned aerial vehicles, cyberspace,
cyber threats
1. INTRODUCTION
The authors of the article are of
the opinion that these days potential terrorists do not have to infiltrate,
physically or personally, the system of the airport security. The same effects
can be achieved by using, for example, the so-called cyberspace, or open space
of communication via computers and computer memories operating worldwide. This
relatively new environment allows interaction and coupling of tools of creating
information, registering, and communication. Today, the common storage of
information in information systems makes cyberspace the main centre in which
information exists. Therefore, it is possible to effectively manipulate this
information or even generate false information, which threatens the security of
civil aviation.
It should be assumed
that terrorists can also take action in the so-called operational sector of the
airport. This is understood by the airport facilities and the surrounding area,
in which other entities provide assistance to an endangered aircraft within the
of radius 8,000 m, in the case of a certified airport and 3,000 m, in the case
of airport with limited certification or an airport for exclusive use - from
the airport reference point [6]. In the operational zone of the airport, an act
of unlawful interference may be used by minelaying, small arms,
rocket-propelled grenades, portable missile kits and unmanned aerial vehicles.
These are measures that effectively target objects at low altitudes.
One should not
underestimate the possible use of anti-aircraft missile sets by terrorists in
order to shoot down a civil passenger aircraft, especially during take-off or
landing. Currently, it is estimated that there are several tens of thousands of
anti-aircraft missile sets, which are beyond any control. It should be expected
that these means may fall into the wrong hands.
The development and
miniaturisation of unmanned aerial vehicles denote that they are being
increasingly used not only in the armies of different countries but also by
civil institutions and individuals. Drones are characterised by a low unit
price, which makes them very attractive to use. Low price and the growing
fighting capabilities of these vehicles turn them into an increasing air
threat. A collision of a passenger plane with such an object can have tragic
consequences.
The aim of this article
is to identify and characterise new threats to civil aviation, which have often
been disregarded. The research problem has been put in the form of a question:
How do anti-aerial mines, anti-aircraft missile sets, unmanned aerial vehicles
and cyberspace operations threaten civil aviation? In order to achieve the
purpose of the article and answer the adopted problem, the authors focused on
the following hazards. In aviation, it is believed that threats are the
potential or existing phenomena, situations or actions affecting the aviation
safety, posing a danger to life and health, property (aircraft and all aviation
infrastructure), environment as well as limiting opportunities of the
development of aviation organisations. The discussed threats are connected
with: the ability to use anti-aircraft mines and anti-missile kits against a
civil aircraft in the operational airport zone, the use of unmanned flying
systems in the operational area of the airport and the use of cyberspace in a
criminal way, in relation to civil aviation.
2. ANTI-AIRCRAFT MINES AS THREATS
FOR THE SECURITY OF CIVIL AVIATION
In many armies all over
the world, the enhancement of mining to combat air objects has been
intensified. Therefore, the application of this means of destruction for
terrorist purposes [9] cannot be disregarded. Due to the wide use of the latest
technological advances in the field of electronics and materials engineering,
efficient mines, both laid manually, in a mechanised manner and remotely
operated, have been constructed. Owing to explosives, the so-called directional
firing, it became possible not only to destroy armoured targets from large
distances but also low-flying objects [9].
The capabilities of
these means can be traced back to the example of the anti-helicopter mine,
which was developed by the State Scientific Research Centre of Air Systems, on
the outskirts of Moscow. The mine is intended to destroy targets at a distance
of up to 150 m, using an explosively formed penetrator. It is designed for
combat purposes of low-flying aeroplanes, helicopters and UAVs [11].
The mine detects the
target using the sound system at a distance of 1 km, rotates the unit towards
the target, scans its direction with an infrared sensor and finally fires the
explosively formed penetrator. The mine can be laid manually or by means of
land or aircraft resources of mining. The time of minelaying manually equals 5
min [11].
The sound sensor
sensitivity allows detection of a flying unmanned apparatus at a distance of
0.6 km and in the case of a helicopter, at a distance of 3.2 km. The noise
selection system allows detecting the sound of an aircraft or a helicopter
engine in the noises of the battlefield. In the case of recognising a target at
a distance of approximately 1 km, the mine turns into the direction of the
target and activates infrared sensors (4-6 sensors), which ensure accurate
homing-in.
Fig. 1. Russian anti-helicopter mine [11]
It is not possible when
another target is being intercepted.Simultaneous operation of acoustic sensors
and infrared sensors exclude a reaction of a mine to thermal traps fired by the
target. After the target enters the firing zone of destruction (a hemisphere
with a radius of 150 m), the explosively formed penetrator is fired, which hits
the target at a speed of approximately 2,500 m/s. The operating time of a
combat mine is not less than 3 months [11].
3. PORTABLE ANTI-ANTICRAFT ROCKET
SETS - A SIMPLE AND DANGEROUS WEAPON.
A portable anti-aircraft
missile is a lightweight anti-aircraft rocket intended to fight visually
observable air targets, including planes, helicopters and other objects
emitting radiation in the infrared spectral range. Due to the risks involved by
this type of weapon, its possession, as well as international sales, are
tightly controlled. Furthermore, too much attention is placed on terrorist
attacks and on international trade, also in view of the threat of terrorist
attacks using anti-aircraft rocket sets. The advances of technique and
technology made it possible to construct portable anti-aircraft missile sets,
operated on the battlefield by one soldier. They are now used at all levels of
air defence. They are capable of fighting objects at distances ranging from
several hundred meters to several hundred kilometres and altitudes between
several meters to tens of kilometres. Thus, there is no doubt that
anti-aircraft sets which remain in the hands of terrorists and accidental
persons pose a threat to civil aircraft.
Despite the continuous
development of aircraft, portable anti-aircraft rocket kits still remain an
extremely dangerous and very effective means of combating air targets. They are
a focus of attention of all armies globally and, most importantly, of terrorist
organisations. This is proved by the increasing incidents of stealing
anti-aircraft sets from military depots and an ongoing demand in the market of
illegal arms trade.
MANPADS (Man-Portable
Air-Defence Systems) are systems for combating air targets, mainly intended for
operation by a single soldier. They have been frequently used in various armed
conflicts since 1969, that is, since the Egyptian-Israeli border clashes. The
main element of MANPADS is an anti-aircraft rocket, placed in a tabular
launcher, which guides itself to the most intense source of thermal radiation,
which is the aircraft engine. By assumption, it is designed to be an
inexpensive system, which is why its construction is simplified. For example,
the same rocket does not have a proximity fuse, but an impact one, hence the
eruption occurs at a time when it directly hits the warmest place of the
aircraft. In addition, generally external detection systems are not used, and
the detection itself is made by using a rocket homing head, in-built in the
launcher tube. Moreover, the launch device is switched off and can be reused
after replacing the used launcher.
The simplicity of the
system does not mean that it is ineffective. Furthermore, it translates into
the simplicity of its operation. It does not have any special calibration
systems, tests
and aiming. Everything is quite tough, and occasionally unaffected by errors of
the operators. Initially, the easily accessible Russian rockets were the most
effective. A good example can be Vietnamese, who only in the years 1972 - 1975
launched 589 rockets Strela-2 and Strela-2M that hit 204 American aircraft.
They were also used in Africa, South and Central America, Asia and the Middle
East.
An increasing number of
acts of violence aimed at the aviation infrastructure forced the international
community to take elementary actions to continuously modernise the level of
civil aviation security. According to some estimates, there are probably more
than half a million MANPADS around the world. Some models of these weapons are
widely available and can be purchased on the black market. The attacks which
occurred several years ago by means of short- range infrared homing missiles
led to a situation that aircraft developers and supervisory bodies began to
consider equipping commercial aircraft with protection systems of missile defence.
Various surface-to-air missiles require different defence systems, which
creates a number of opportunities for their producers. Only Israel decided to
equip its civil aircraft with this device after an incident in 2002, when a
plane, Arkia, was fired at in Mombasa during takeoff. Fortunately, the
projectile missed the target. In accordance with the governmental Sky Shield
programme, jet aircraft belonging to the national carrier El Al Israel
Airlines, Arkia Israel Airlines and Israir Airlines are equipped with such
equipment, which is manufactured by the local company Elbit Systems. The
position of Israel was that the benefits outweighed the costs and insecurity.
The majority of
anti-missile systems, designed for aircraft and helicopters, are to counter
short-range and shoulder-fired missile threats. The USA equipped most of its
military transport units with such protective devices, similarly to the United
Kingdom and Australia. The systems manufactured by Northrop Grumman are in
service with the heads of states, for example, the Air Force One carrying the
President of the United States as well as the German aircraft transporting the
Chancellor.
The most important
effect of mounting the system of self-protection on board an aircraft is to
enhance the situational awareness for pilots, who are being informed about
possible risks from anti-aircraft infrared guided missiles. The main aim of the
kit is to defend against terrorists’, militants’ or various rebels’ weapons, that is, against portable
anti-aircraft short- range missile kits, MANPADS-type.
The Ukrainian company,
ADRON Research and Development Company (R&D Ltd.)
from Kiev, jointly with the Institute of NPK Progress in Nieżyn have been
developing and producing such systems since 1982. The first of these,
originally used in the Mi-24 helicopter was the 166W1AE intended for its
protection against heat-seeking missile attacks. It produces an apparent source
of infrared radiation in space. The device KT-01AWJe "ADROS" is the
most modern version of the device L-166W1AE. On the helicopter Mi-24W with
upgraded electrical wiring, the beams may be used interchangeably for both
devices. Adron R&D Ltd has designed the equipment which protects
helicopters and aircraft from all existing infrared threats, including MANPAD
missiles, mistaking or "dazzling" the rocket guidance system and
thereby changing the flight trajectory.
"ADROS"
protects the aircraft against a direct strike from various types of missiles
with infrared guided warheads, which operate in the modulation mode:
-
amplitude-phase.
-
frequency-phase.
-
time-impulse.
The infrared radiation emitted by the
radiator lamp with an electromechanical modulator is processed into subsequent
thermal impulses. Infrared impulses that occur in such an order give misleading
information about the location of the protected aircraft in relation to the
optical axis of the head of an attacking missile. The presence of interference
in the channel of the rocket control leads to disturbances of its trajectory,
missile transition into a flight along an extending spiral until the loss of
the tracked target. In the system there is no readiness mode, it runs
continuously during the whole mission by providing stable and
enduring protection for the plane or a helicopter. The system “tricks"
all IR missiles within its range so that it is unnecessary to calculate the
position of coordinates of the attacking projectile. The software is designed in the Assembler software code. It is flexible
for future reprogramming and future system upgrades.
The aircraft protection
against IR guided missiles is one of the priorities in the present time. The
reason being the very high effectiveness of such missiles. Recent war
experiences show that approximately 90% of all aircraft shot down in armed
conflicts are destroyed by infrared- guided missiles.
The protection of
aircraft against MANPADS-type missiles is usually ensured by creating false
thermal targets by means of thermal or optical active electronic jamming
systems. The operation of the electronic-optical active jamming systems is
based on the principle of modular jamming of infrared radiation.
Although the aircraft
protection devices against the discussed systems, are produced and mounted on
military aircraft, the analysis shows that there is a possibility of fixing
them on civil aircraft or helicopters.
Additional equipment of
the aircraft with a radar warning receiver (RWR) would be designed to warn the
crew against the illumination of air-defence artillery and missile launcher
radars so as to take protective measures at an early stage, for example, in the
form of avoiding such positions. In this way, it would be possible to take
appropriate measures to prevent an attack.
Presumably, there are a number of measures and
aircraft protection systems currently against the most popular MANPADS attacks.
They differ in the mode of action, the possibility of using them, the degree of complexity and obviously the price,
which undoubtedly is one of the key issues when making a decision on the
purchase and the application of a given means by an air carrier.
4. UNMANNED FLYING SYSTEMS - A
THREAT IN THE AIRPORT OPERATIONAL ZONE
When considering the
subject of threats to aviation, arising from the use of unmanned aircraft, in
the first place, it is necessary to explain what they are. An unmanned vehicle
is understood as a design for the execution of a flight, able to move cargo
with the exception of transporting passengers. A more accurate explanation is
included in NATO terminology, where the device is defined as follows: "a
power-driven aerial vehicle, disposable or reusable, using aerodynamic forces
to provide lift, which is controlled by or piloted remotely, capable of
carrying lethal or non-lethal loads "[7]. The discussed aircraft are
characterised by a variety of parameters and performance. Among the most
important ones are: weight, range, endurance, and the practical ceiling. Due to
their properties, the scope of their operators ranges from the armed forces,
law enforcement services to civil companies. However, they are a source of
threats to civil aviation, including airports. They result not only from
deliberate human activity, but also from ignorance, misuse of unmanned aerial
vehicles, too easy access to this type of flying devices, and the lack of
appropriate legislation.
A significant threat to
airports is near miss incidents when unmanned aircraft come too close to manned
landing machines which were taking off or performing other air operations in
the vicinity of the mentioned sites. In the history of aviation, there are
numerous suchlike examples. A serious incident occurred on 20 July 2015 during
an approach to landing of the airline Lufthansa at Warsaw Chopin Airport. The
threat was caused by a drone, which was approximately 100 m from an Embraer 195.
It is necessary to mention an event of March 2014 when a remotely operated
rotorcraft was noticed at a distance of 30 m away from a Boeing 777 by its crew
at Vancouver airport. Then in April 2014 at the same airport, a camera mounted
on board an unmanned aerial vehicle recorded its flight at a very short
distance from a landing aircraft. Another example was nearing of an unmanned
aerial vehicle to a landing in a US Airways aeroplane at Tallahassee airport,
on March 22, 2014 [11]. A dangerous incident took place in December 2014 at
Heathrow airport, when a UAV was observed a dozen meters away from a landing
aircraft [4]. Two incidents which occurred in the year 2014 in Australia also
worth mentioning. On March 19, during an approach to landing at the airport in
Perth, the pilot of DHC-8 had to abruptly change the course. This was due to
the presence of a small flying object (witnesses of the event described it as a
cylindrically-shaped unmanned aerial vehicle). To be precise, the aircraft,
belonging to the carrier Skippers, passed the object at a distance of 20 m
horizontally and 100 feet vertically. Three days later, the incident was
repeated, namely, a rescue helicopter pilot had to perform an evasive manoeuvre
to avoid a collision with an approaching unmanned aerial vehicle [1]. These
incidents are just a few examples of dangerous near-miss incidents between
unmanned aerial vehicles and manned aircraft. The threat results from the
possibility of damage to the airframe, executing air operations within an airport,
which may result in an emergency landing or even crashing the machine, and
consequently in the damage or destruction of property, loss of health or even
life of crew members and/or passengers.
Due to easy access to
unmanned aerial vehicles, they are used by terrorist groups. It is extremely
dangerous since these devices enable carrying loads which may cause an
explosion. In this way, it is possible to easily damage fuel storage depots,
aircraft in aprons and even worse, damage terminals exposed to danger. The
awareness is further expanded by the fact that these objects are remotely
controlled by devices which enable operators to perform precise guidance
towards the target. In addition, they are relatively small in size, thus quick
detection tends to be difficult. A number of initiatives is being taken to
counteract the discussed acts of unlawful interference. Defensive systems are
been developed due to the increasing number of hazards connected with the use
of unmanned aerial vehicles. An example is a solution applied in France. In
case of discovering an unmanned aerial vehicle in a closed air space, the
so-called anti-drones are activated, whose aim is to throw metal nets on the
rotors of intruders [8].
5. ACTIVITY IN
CYBERSPACE AS A THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION
For several years,
actions which breach security in the cyberspace, have been increasingly
important. They are as important as the traditional ones. Cyberspace is the
"space of processing and exchange of information generated by
teleinformation systems [...] with the links between them and the relationship
with users," [2]. In view of the above, it may be considered a virtual
sphere designed to transfer, collect and share data. However, that is not all.
The applications are linked with the possibility of attacks against information
systems. In the case of the discussed subject, these are airport systems. For
this reason, it is essential to care about maintaining an appropriate level of
cybersecurity, which is understood as "a set of organisational and legal,
technical, physical and educational designed to ensure uninterrupted
functioning of cyberspace"(5). With regard to airports, this notion can be
defined among others as the detection, response or prevention, counteracting
deliberate actions conducted in cyberspace that are aimed at the violation of
the information systems used at airports. Due to a wide spectrum of
possibilities to pose threats in the discussed area, the examples of these were
divided into intentional and unintentional actions. Intentional actions include the use of [13]:
-
malware: a
virus, a network worm, a Trojan horse, a dialler, a botnet.
-
breaking security: unauthorised logs, account hacking,
hacking into an application.
-
internet publications: offensive content, copyright
breaching, misinformation.
-
gathering information: scanning, wiretapping, social
engineering, espionage.
-
computer sabotage: unauthorised exchange of
information, unauthorised access or unauthorised use of the information, denial
of access, deleting data, use of vulnerabilities in devices.
-
the human factor: deliberate violations of security
procedures, violating binding legal regulations.
-
cyber
terrorism:a terrorist crime committed in cyberspace.
On
the other hand, unintentional activities are [13]:
-
accidents and fortuitous events: hardware failures,
link and software failures.
-
the human factor: an unintentional violation of
procedures, negligence, incorrect configuration of a device.
Due to increasingly
occurring offences in cyberspace, in almost every sphere of human life, the
scientific and aviation community began to research, seeking preventive and
protective solutions. This is evidenced by conferences devoted to this subject.
So far, two high-profile meetings have been held on cyberspace in civil
aviation. The authors of this article participated in the second meeting (High
Level International Conference on Cybersecurity in civil aviation), which was
held on 08-09 November 2017 in Cracow. During the deliberations, an adoption of
a strategy of proactive conduct in cyberspace was stressed. It was also
suggested that the fragmentation of the management systems should be avoided.
Attention was also drawn to the Directive
of the EU Parliament and the Council on measures to promote a high common level
of security of networks and information systems in the EU (Directive NIS). The
document obliges the Member States to implement the national strategy for the
security of networks and information systems. Moreover, in accordance with the
development of Cyber-Security, a new
challenge for the aviation and Automotive industries suggestions were
listed which seem to be most appropriate for the security of the aviation
industry and, in particular, airports against cyber threats. These, among
others, include [14]: an introduction of tests checking the resistance of
systems cyberthreats, testing of critical systems by external and independent
companies that have genuine knowledge of cybersecurity, ensuring a high level
of security of critical systems for communication. Moreover, every company in
the airline industry should assess their needs in the perspective of
cybersecurity; governments should establish appropriate norms and regulations
in the field of cybersecurity.
On the basis of the
above considerations, it appears that cyber threats are a relatively new, but
extremely significant threat to airports. For this reason, numerous initiatives
are taken to strengthen the resilience of systems to this type of threats.
Unfortunately, the continuous development of technology promotes more frequent
offences in cyberspace, making it difficult to conduct preventive actions.
6. CONCLUSION
The article is entitled:
“Selected threats to civil aviation”. In relation to the subject, the authors
adopted the following objective: identification and characteristics of new
threats to aviation, which had previously been overlooked. The research problem
is included in the question: How do anti-aerial mines, MANPADS, unmanned aerial
vehicles and cyberspace operations threaten civil aviation? The answer to the
research problem required careful analysis and, consequently, a synthesis of
the literature and the use of knowledge acquired in the course of learning and
professional work. For decades, the threat posed to civil aviation by
individuals, have been associated with their presence and a physical attempt to
overcome all sorts of security measures and regulations. Currently, this
situation is changing. As it is commonly known, persons seeking to jeopardise
this branch of transport are usually one step ahead of the law and security.
This considerably hampers the work of services and induces a search for new
legal or technical solutions.
The authors focused on
four types of threats, that is, the ability to use anti-aircraft mines, MANPADS
against a civil aircraft in the operational airport zone, the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles flying in the operational area of the airport and the use of
the cyberspace in a criminal way with regard to civil aviation.
Obviously, there are
already technical systems which disturb the drone control or cause its physical
destruction, however, they will not always be effectively used. Despite the
existing technical solutions in that matter, the legal ones lag behind.
With regard to the
protection of aircraft against air-mines, it seems that the only sensible
solution is to patrol the operational airport zone, conducted on the ground and
also in the air by means of unmanned aerial systems. By applying them, it is
also possible to detect other threats such as tracking suspicious vehicles or
individuals from the air.
MANPADS pose a serious
threat, yet, due to advances in modern technology, this threat will be
mitigated. Available off-the-shelf solutions should be implemented. It is worth
investing in these measures.
The greatest challenge
for civil aviation is its protection in cyberspace. The availability and
universality of networking solutions intensifies this challenge even further.
It cannot be stated that civil aviation is here, completely helpless. In the
present conditions, the applied solutions bring appropriate results, however,
still the question might be asked whether we will not be astonished by future
developments?
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Received 12.10.2018; accepted in revised form 30.12.2018
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