Article
citation information:
Kycko, M., Zabłocki, W. Certification in control
command and signalling system investment processes. Scientific Journal of Silesian University of Technology. Series
Transport. 2018, 101, 119-130.
ISSN: 0209-3324. DOI: https://doi.org/10.20858/sjsutst.2018.101.11.
Magdalena KYCKO[1],
Wiesław ZABŁOCKI[2]
CERTIFICATION IN
CONTROL COMMAND AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM INVESTMENT PROCESSES
Summary. Railway system infrastructure,
including control subsystems, is subject to continuous normative technical and
legal regulations as defined by EU directives and European Commission
regulations, as well as national railway administrations decrees. The aim of
regulation is the optimization, harmonization and pursuit of the full
interoperability, among others, of control subsystems, through the Control
Command and Signalling Technical Specifications for Interoperability (CCS TSI),
thereby providing consistency in terms of safety assurance level improvements.
Regardless of TSI and baseline specification sets, it is crucial that
certification processes function according to specific rules and procedures. In
this publication, certification issues concerning a control subsystem and its
elements will be discussed. It is assumed that the certification process should
include a complex approach to CCS, starting from the project phase and
finishing at the adaptation and trial exploitation phase. It is critical that
CCS system adaptation is intensified in the PKP PLK.
Keywords: railway investments; European Commission
certification; interoperability
1. INTRODUCTION
Currently,
the railway business is experiencing dynamic growth. In the coming years, a
series of infrastructural railway investments is planned in line with
strategies for railway transport growth in Poland. A fundamental factor related
to the investment process is certification. Without a certification process,
investment will not be given placed-in-service authorization. Taking into
consideration the safety of railway investment, the certification of the
control subsystem and/or its components, which are responsible directly for
control command safety, is crucial.
The
duty of pursuing European Commission (EC) certification processes is, among
others, the result of acceptance of a directive on the interoperability of the
rail system within the EU (2008/57/EC) [6]. In the foregoing directive,
subsystems for the creation of a railway system are defined, as well as
fundamental requirements, which are described in Attachment III to the
directive [6].
Fig. 1. Structural and functional subsystems
division
(developed on the basis of [6])
Detailed
requirements for individual subsystems have been defined in the so-called
Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI). These documents set out
the requirements regarding individual subsystems, as well as requirements
related to cooperating subsystems’ interfaces and interoperability
component requirements. This article is dedicated to control subsystems.
Aside
from European law requirements, there are also national ones, which are
included in the “List of National Technical Specification and
Normalization Documents, Which Enable Meeting the Fundamental Requirements
Regarding the Interoperability of the Railway System” [11], published by
the President of the Office of Railway Transport (UTK).
Currently,
there are many crucial and complicated infrastructural investments being
pursued, which require compliance on the part of contractors with a great deal
of European and national legislation. The certification process is aimed at
confirming that specific investment is pursued according to the law. When the
evaluation is positive, a contractor seeking to invest will receive EC
validation certificates, and, the in following stage, will be able to receive
placed-in-service authorization from the UTK President. Due to the PKP PLK
pursuing many tenders, it is more common that new projects or even whole
investments are pursued by newly established companies, which do not have
sufficient knowledge about railway investment implementation or the
certification process.
Certification
process implementation, as well as attaining European certificates, is both
complicated and time-consuming. However, it is a necessity that ensures
transport network integrity in Europe. This article is aimed at underlining the
importance of certification and bringing its meaning closer to investment
processes.
2. CONTROL SUBSYSTEM CERTIFICATION PROCESS:
CERTIFICATION BY NATIONAL LAW AND CERTIFICATION BY EUROPEAN LAW
The certification process is mainly
based on European law requirements, which have been stated in the relevant
directive [6] and the TSI. In addition, some national law requirements are in
effect. They need to be applied when issues not included in the TSI (indicated
them as open points or not specified at all) are under evaluation. One of the
main areas outside the scope of the TSI is the Control Command and Signalling
(CSS) System [13].
The CCS system is trifold [13] and
comprises: CCS system interlocking, the trackside part of automatic train
protection (ATP) and the on-board side of ATP. Interlocking is defined as the
control of track and turnout vacancies, systems using them as well as equipment
protecting railway crossings. Interlocking is evaluated according to national
law. The requirements are included in an EC implementing regulation [3], which
refers to the UTK President’s list [11] as an applying document. The ATP
is based on safe digital data transfer. The data are uploaded from the
interlocking and passed to the vehicles. In the EU, ATP has been presented as
an interoperative solution fully defined under European law. The solution is
labelled as the European Rail Transport Management System (ERTMS).
The EC certification process is
carried out by notified bodies in reference to the Railway Directive [6]. There
are several units in Poland, which can be found on the New Approach Notified
and Designated Organisations (NANDO) [12] database, including information about
their accreditation area. The notified body should be engaged in pursuing an
investment process from the very start, i.e., project evaluation. The
certification process is presented in Figure 2.
The EC verification of
“control: trackside device” and “control: on-board
device” subsystems is pursued separately. In the case of on-board
devices, EC verification applies to on-board ERTMS/ETCS and ERTMS/GSM-R
devices. In Poland, on-board devices related to control is limited to the SHP
system, as well as 1,500-MHz radio including a RADIOSTOP function. Those
systems are evaluated separately from ETCS and GSMR verification.
Regarding trackside devices,
interlocking [13] is crucial. Essential, safe data, based on which movement
authorities (MAs) are generated, are uploaded from the interlocking. Control
subsystem compliance verification does not have to include the whole subsystem
as defined by the law. For example, a railway line might be equipped with a
GMS-R system and not equipped with ETCS, or vice versa. In such a situation,
intermediate certification is issued.
The EC certification process is
pursued according to the chosen conformity assessment module. Conformity
assessment modules are defined in Commission Decision 2010/713/EU [1]. There
are modules specified in the TSI, the use of which is authorized in the certification
process for the respective subsystem or interoperability constituent.
Conformity assessment modules, which are permitted in the control subsystem
certification process, are presented below. The main ones used are in bold.
Fig. 2. Certification process (own elaboration)
(the meaning of each module will be explained in Figure 3)
Fig. 3. Interoperability constituent and
control subsystem assessment modules
(own elaboration based on [4])
Interoperability constituents, as
described in Figure 3, have been separated from the control subsystem in
accordance with the relevant EC regulation [4].
The EC certification process depends
on the specific assessment module, while each certification process needs to
confirm that the respective system or device is compliant with relevant TSI
requirements. Based on what is chosen by the notified body for EC certificates,
the subsystem or interoperability constituent producer is able to issue an EC
certificate of conformity, and, subsequently, with appropriate documentation,
apply for placed-in-service authorization of the subsystem or interoperability
constituent at the office of the UTK President.
The certification process may have
indirect or direct effects on the whole railway investment, but it mostly
affects safety. That is why the certification stage is significant for any
investment process. Therefore, it is very important that the certification
process is carried out by a complete notified body.
Fig. 4. List of control subsystem constituents
(own elaboration based on [4])
3. INVESTMENT PROCESS AND ITS EFFECT ON CCS
SYSTEM SAFETY
Over the past few years, the growth in the
number of railway investments has become noticeable. The size of the projects
in such a short period is connected to strong growth in the level of railway
investment risks.
Among the main factors responsible for
railway transport’s safety are CCS systems, which have developed
considerably over the past few years. New CCS systems made by various producers
have appeared on the market, while there has also been an increase in the level
of railway investment risks. In the CCS sector itself, more and more
investments linked to the introduction of new, interoperable systems have
appeared. According to [9], submitted in July 2017 to European Commission, it
is predicted that by 2023, 2,667 km of railway lines will be equipped with an
ETCS system; by 2030, that figure will double, exceeding 6,700 km.
Simultaneously, GSM-R system implementation on the majority of railway lines in
Poland is planned.
In the course of railway investments that
include CCS systems, contractors are obliged to comply with many legal
documents, such as norms, Commission regulations and the TSI. All the
requirements are indirectly or directly aimed at increasing system safety
levels in relation to the investment.
The investment process itself can affect the
safety of a CCS system, causing a potential risk. In order to better visualize
such a risk, an example of a situation that took place in the context of a
railway investment is described below.
The example involves the installation of ECTS
1 [8] system devices on Line E-65 CMK. After the installation, reception and
implementation of a system, during the trial exploitation period, LEU coder
failures, caused by lightning discharges, have become commonplace on account of
repeatability. Other exploitation issues may include:
- CCS system diversity, which
creates difficulties with interface implementation
- connecting cables with balise
manufacturing technology
- beacon signal light bulb
socket connection conductivity
The relevant issue in this example can be
expressed by the question concerning what might have caused the damage, despite
the fact installation was carried out by an experienced company, which carries
a European certificate authorizing it to install ETCS systems. Additionally,
the system was examined after installation and subject to certification.
Preliminary analysis of the cause might indicate the following defect factors:
- low LEU coder resistance of
overvoltages caused by atmospheric discharges (susceptible electronic
components or lack of an overvoltage protective system)
- installation causes resulting
from return wire issues
LEU damage and other ETCS 1 installation
issues cause, or might cause, the absolute phase-out of authorizing signals,
ruling out their display until service repair. Consequently, “STOP”
signals are displayed. During that time, the human factor is decisive regarding
the train journey, in terms of whether to implement the journey on “Sz”
or special order “S”, which in turn becomes the cause of the safety
hazard.
The aim of the above example is to emphasize
how the investment process has a direct or indirect effect on a CCS
system’s safety. The foregoing example explains that emergency situations
involving a safe CCS system, in order to provide movement sustainability,
implicate human factor interference, which is a safety hazard.
Another significant conclusion is that an
investment process cannot be managed without a certain organization of
cooperation between the ordering institution and the contractor (contractors).
This undoubtedly requires the selection of adequate, qualified staff and
infrastructure resources.
Below is a list of other risks that might
occur during an investment process, which affect safety levels and the
certification process itself.
Table
1
Investment
process risks (own elaboration).
|
Risk category |
Risk factor |
|
|
1. |
Risks related to projects |
- Insufficient on-site verification and stocktaking
(project cost underestimation) - Mistakes in projects |
|
2. |
Operation risks |
- Increase in assumed operation costs - Climate risks (frosts, floods etc.) |
|
3. |
Administrative/legal risks |
- Delays in receiving investment realization
authorization (e.g., construction), delays in receiving environmental
approval - Law ambiguity (e.g., mistakes in TSI translation) - Changes in law and requirements during investment
processes - Ignoring certification obligation in investment
processes |
|
4. |
Risks related to construction/technical
risks |
- Capital expenditure budget exceeded - Geological risks (unexpected detrimental land
conditions, landslides etc.) - Climate risks (frosts, floods etc.), archaeological
risks (excavation) - Risks related to constructors (bankruptcy, lack of
sufficient resources etc.) - Choice of inappropriate control systems - Failure to comply with high safety level - Necessity to create interfaces between various
systems - Systems/application errors - New technologies (lack of experience) |
|
5. |
Financial risks |
- Availability of national funds for capital expenditure
financing - Increase of installation and maintenance financing
costs - Investment financing, e.g., financing withdrawal - Necessity to maintain two systems during the
transition period - Investment delays, frequent lack of timeliness, - Costs of interfaces between systems are not
considered, they frequently exceed the system costs |
|
6. |
Human factor risks |
- Contractor’s lack of knowledge and experience - External pressure/lack of neutrality - Lack of risk awareness - Lack of CCS specialists - Fatigue/labour in stress |
4. THE MEANING OF CERTIFICATION IN INVESTMENT
PROCESSESS
According to the requirements specified in
tender documentation, the contractor involved in an investment is responsible
for obtaining control subsystem EC verification certificates. The contractor
choses both the notified body and the assessment modules, according to which
the whole certification process is realized. Moreover, the EC certified
contractor issues an EC verification declaration, when simultaneously taking
over responsibility for the specified subsystem.
Based on the above-presented safety hazard
situation, the importance of pursuing the right investment process, as well as
carrying out the certification process, has been shown. While pursuing the
certification process, several errors may occur: during the project, the
construction stage or even final inspection. Such a situation, ultimately, has
an effect on whether the certification process is extended. It leads to delays
in agreement implementation as well as resulting in the imposition of
additional costs, which have not been included in the investment estimated
budget. In a railway investment process, which is aimed at creating a safe
subsystem, the certification process is essential and often confirms compliance
with mandatory document requirements, as well as safety requirements. During
the certification process itself, noticing potential system faults or errors is
not always possible. Defects are detectable only during subsystem exploitation.
Moreover, it is important that such a certification process is carried out by
qualified notified bodies, which increases the probability of detecting
potential errors that might threaten subsystem safety.
In the course of the investment process, the
contractor, independent of the evaluation conducted by the notified body, is
responsible for seeking specific investment, in particular, in subsystem
safety.
5. SELECTED CERTIFICATION PROCESS ISSUES AND
RISKS
During investment processes, the
certification process is not treated by the contractors with adequate
seriousness. The meaning of certification in an investment process is beyond
question. There are some investment contractors that have come across
certification many times; nevertheless, the lack of sufficient knowledge on
legal requirements and certification itself still occurs. One of the most
common mistakes made by investment contractors is a late application to the
notified body, which causes the construction stage to start without the
certificate at the project stage having been issued. It significantly impedes
the implementation of changes detected by the notified body at the project
evaluation stage. Such situations may result in non-certification and the need
for project implementation changes, and, worse still, changes to the already
constructed subsystem, which will also affect investment costs.
In the railway sector, specialists need to
know both technical and legal requirements, which, unfortunately, change
frequently. In recent times, many norms and EC regulations have been modified,
resulting in common issues related to changes in approach or in the production
process. Frequent changes in legal documents are associated with legal
ambiguities or mistakes in document translation, which ultimately leads to
issues in the interpretation of requirements. Currently, work is taking place
on issuing new CSS TSI, with an announcement planned for the second half of
2019. The new specifications will introduce a few essential changes; among
other, a train detection system is going to be a new interoperability
constituent of the control subsystem. The changes are crucial and will
introduce additional “confusion” in terms of investment.
Another issue frequently occurring the during
certification process is the incorrect definition of subsystem borders, which
is especially difficult in the case of the control subsystem. The control
subsystem not only contains devices subject to the investment, but also
interfaces with the existing infrastructure. Even ordering units themselves
forget about interface construction and the necessity of evaluation, instead
preferring to “pin” these issues on investment contractors;
meanwhile, the costs of the
interface exceed the costs of the system. That is why it is important that the
ordering unit cooperates with the contractor from an early stage, which is
increasing less common nowadays.
During the certification process, the lack of
awareness on the part of the contractor about used interoperability
constituents can be encountered. During subsystem evaluation, it may transpire
that used interoperability constituents have not obtained appropriate
certification and EC certificates of conformity. In such situations, subsystems
cannot be evaluated positively, which in turn causes investment realization
delays as well as financial loses.
An additional issue related to the evaluation
of “control: trackside device” and “control: on-board
device” subsystems is the system version update. ERTMS/ETCS and
ERTMS/GSM-R systems are programmable by electronic means [13]. Those systems
are subject to technical development; hence, software updates are created, but
maintaining consistency in terms of the solutions applied to the railway system
scale, in respect of the railway network and the rolling stock, remains an
issue. In order to supervise system version changes, so-called version
management (of collected versions, which are specified as standards) is used.
In the case of the ETCS system, Baseline 2 and Baseline 3 are currently used.
They are defined in Appendix A of the CCS TSI [4]. Each railway line is
equipped with one specified system version. On the Polish railway, Baseline 2
(Version 2.3.0d) is commonly used, with traction units in Poland are currently
equipped or being equipped according to Baseline 2. However, vehicles to be
released into exploitation after 1 January 2019 will need to comply with
Baseline 3 (Version 3.4.0). On-board devices that are compliant with Baseline 3
will need to demonstrate complete compliance with Baseline 2 as well.
For new projects regarding “control:
on-board device” subsystems, assumptions regarding the choice of the
baseline according to Subset 026 are made. Under EU 2014-2020, the
finance-specific System Requirement Specification (SRS) 2.3.0d will be used,
followed by SRS 3.4.0 after 2020.
In order to compensate for the foregoing
situations, risk analysis strategies, which should be pursued at every stage of
an investment [7,10,16], might be helpful. Such approaches are required under
the pertinent directive [5] and EC regulation (402/20130) [2]; nevertheless,
these documents do not specify the methods that should be used to carry out
risk analysis. Therefore, it is necessary that any analysis is carried out by
qualified and experienced specialists.
In terms of control subsystem certification,
risk-generating issues will occur during an investment process. The most
important risks have already been presented above. However, it cannot be
ignored that the CCS construction process might only be initiated after
finishing other subsystems, thus frequent infrastructure construction delays
affect the timeline of control subsystem construction. Such a situation,
ultimately, results in work being rushed and a lack of labour accuracy, which
increases the risk level.
Referring to issues and risks connected to
the CCS system investment certification process, as presented above, it is
necessary to increase the level of awareness and qualifications amongst
contractors. Investments pursued nowadays, as well as the frequency of delays,
indicate that the railway industry needs time to increase the level of
qualifications and adaptation to legal requirements.
5.
CONCLUSION
The subsystem or interoperability constituent
certification process is unavoidable. However, many contractors are aware of
that fact it can be still neglected or that the process can be treated as
unnecessary, in turn delaying the investment. The certification process is
practically the last stage at which project documentation is verified and its
compliance is confirmed. That is why the certification stage is highly
important during any investment process and should be carried out by reliable,
qualified bodies. Additionally, subsystem verification is an essential
component in the assurance of conformity with basic parameters and essential
requirements, which provide the interoperability of railway systems in the EU.
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Received 13.08.2018; accepted in revised form 03.11.2018
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